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This Article examines the Supreme Court’s recent Second 
Amendment cases1 as applications of the same libertarian bias that has 
undermined constitutional law’s fundamental rights doctrine.  The 
concept of a libertarian bias that is based in a New Lochnerism was 
previously introduced in both The Fifth Freedom and The New Due Process.2  
 
 1  See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010); District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 2  Areto A. Imoukhuede, The Fifth Freedom: The Constitutional Duty to Provide Public 
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The analysis here demonstrates that the recently revised doctrine 
regarding the Second Amendment and gun rights is driven by the 
current Supreme Court (“Court”) hostility towards government 
regulation in a manner that is akin to what was seen during the Lochner 
Era.3 
Regrettably, this Article is timely and is expected to continue to 
be so in light of ongoing gun violence and mass shootings that 
continue to plague the United States, including the recent mass 
shooting in Orlando, Florida.  The Court’s decisions have cast a long 
legal shadow, which has resulted in states and the federal government 
becoming justifiably fearful of running afoul of the Court’s latest 
Second Amendment limitations espoused in District of Columbia. v. 
Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago.4  This is a legitimate fear, given 
that the current Second Amendment limits are grounded in neither 
the text of the Constitution nor precedent, which makes it difficult for 
lawmakers to accurately predict what the Court will next deign to be 
impermissible.5 
 
Education, 22 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 45 (2011); Areto A. Imoukhuede, Education 
Rights and the New Due Process, 47 IND. L. REV. 467 (2014).  
 3  See Brief of Law Professors Erwin Chemerinsky and Adam Winkler, as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 
07-290), 2008 WL 157186, at *12–13, *15 (demonstrating inconsistency within the 
position adopted by the Court in the Lochner era); PAUL KENS, LOCHNER V. NEW YORK: 
ECONOMIC REGULATION ON TRIAL 4, 198 (1998) (Lochner remains essential to the battles 
over the Court’s role in the ideological conflict which pits the free market against the 
duty of the regulatory state); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 
877 (1987). 
 4  McDonald, 561 U.S. at 742; Heller, 554 U.S. at 570. 
 5  See Stephen Kiehl, In Search of a Standard: Gun Regulations After Heller and 
McDonald, 70 MD. L. REV. 1131, 1134–35, 1162 (2011) (discussing the well-established 
state and federal court precedent regarding the Second Amendment prior to Heller 
and McDonald, and how the Courts’ departure from precedent gives subsequent courts 
a legitimate fear of overstepping constitutional limits); Kyle Hatt, Gun-Shy Originalism: 
The Second Amendment’s Original Purpose, in District of Columbia v. Heller, 44 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 505, 506 (2011) (discussing how the Court’s current interpretation of the 
Second Amendment is contrary to the amendment’s original purpose, which was to 
protect Americans’ ability to resist the tyranny of their federal government).  Heller, 
through holding that the Second Amendment protects one’s individual rights to bear 
arms for self-defense, led to limitations on the type of arms one could possess, which 
made the original purpose of the Second amendment “unachievable.”  See also District 
of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 637–38 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (adopting 
an Originalist approach towards interpreting the Second Amendment, and arguing 
that the majority was wrong in adopting the individual rights argument and for 
ignoring the clear precedent set forth in Miller); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION 
BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 10, 11, 
14–15 (1993); Saul Cornell & Nathan Kozuskanich, Introduction: The D.C. Gun Case, in 
THE SECOND AMENDMENT ON TRIAL: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER 
1 (Saul Cornell & Nathan Kozuskanich eds., 2013) (explaining that the Supreme Court 
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Although not the sole cause of regulatory paralysis in the face of 
widespread gun violence and mass shootings, the Court’s gun rights 
decisions have certainly contributed to the reluctance of state and 
federal law makers to pass meaningful gun regulations.  The Court’s 
decisions to limit the ability of government to regulate firearms has 
real consequences that cannot be ignored and should not be dismissed 
as collateral to individual rights or as in tension with those rights.  This 
Article suggests that public safety is a right; a positive right that is 
fundamental under the Constitution. 
This discussion begins in Part II by introducing the Lochner Era 
and its regulatory goals of protecting liberty, limiting government 
regulation, and protecting federalism and states’ rights.6  Part III 
examines how the Court has once again privileged liberty over duty 
through its radical reinterpretation of the Second Amendment in 
District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago.7  The Court 
has applied its libertarian bias and lost sight of the constitutional duties 
of government.8  In the specific context of the Second Amendment 
and gun rights, the Court has lost sight of the duty to protect the public 
safety.9  Part IV examines the pre-Heller interpretation of the Second 
Amendment and suggests that this meaning was more consistent with 
the text of the Constitution, the intent of the founders, and the 
constitutional duty of government to protect the public safety. 
 
struck down the District of Columbia’s gun control laws as a violation of the Second 
Amendment and consequently reversed almost seventy years of settled precedent); 
Enrique Schaerer, What the Heller?: An Originalist Critique of Justice Scalia’s Second 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 795, 797 (2014) (showing that fear of 
overstepping the constitutional limitation established by the Court in Heller is well 
founded, because Justice Scalia did not base his decision on the text of the 
Constitution or intent of the founders); David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 
U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 379 (2003) (explaining that Lochner was wrongly decided because 
the Court engaged in judicial activism and that a problem arises when judges enforce 
rights that they created themselves). 
 6  See KENS, supra note 3, at 4 (discussing how the Lochner era was concerned with 
protecting liberty and was constantly battling with the government’s regulatory duty).  
 7  See generally McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010); District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 8  See Paul Kens, Lochner v. New York: Tradition or Change in Constitutional Law?, 1 
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 404, 404–05 (2005) (explaining that the Court lost sight of its 
constitutional duties as it usurped power that properly rested in the Legislature, and 
ultimately the people, in order to implement its own “political philosophy into 
fundamental law of the land”).  Furthermore, the judiciary’s decision has been called 
an “‘anti-canon of constitutional law’ and a ‘paradigmatic example of judicial failure.’” 
 9  See Cornell & Kozuskanich, supra note 5, at 3–4 (arguing that the Court lost sight 
of the government’s duty to provide safety when it ruled the way it did in Heller and 
McDonald).  
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II. IMPLEMENTING A LOCHNER ERA IDEAL: REDUCED REGULATORY 
POWER 
The Lochner Era, which historians and legal scholars largely agree 
stretched from 1887 to 1937,10 was a period when the Supreme Court 
overruled more cases on constitutional grounds than ever before in 
American history.11  The period is of particular relevance because the 
Lochner Era’s jurisprudential theory holds that the Constitution 
mandates little to no government regulatory power.12  The public 
policy problems that resulted are prominent in the most recent gun 
rights decisions. 
A. Lochnerism’s Regulatory Goals 
The Lochner Era regulatory goals that are most obviously reflected 
in the modern gun rights cases are its ostensible goals of preserving 
liberty, limited government, and states’ rights.13  These goals are visible 
in the modern gun rights cases of Heller and McDonald.14  These are 
ostensible goals, because, as the literature demonstrates, they were not 
consistently pursued, and ultimately served as rhetorical cover for 
implementing a libertarian legislative agenda through the judiciary.15 
 
 10  See KENS, supra note 3, at 194 (acknowledging that in 1937 the case West Coast 
Hotel v. Parrish marked the end of the Lochner era as the Court upheld a Washington 
statute for minimum wages and also rejected liberty of contract as a doctrine); Strauss, 
supra note 5, at 374 (acknowledging 1937 as marking the end of the Lochner era, 
evidenced by the case West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish). 
 11  See Strauss, supra note 5, at 373 (explaining that it was during the Lochner era “in 
which the Supreme Court invalidated nearly two hundred social welfare and 
regulatory measures, including minimum wage laws, laws designed to enable 
employees to unionize, and a federal statute establishing a pension system for railway 
workers”).  
 12  See KENS, supra note 3, at 71–74. 
 13  See generally KENS, supra note 3, at 71, 74 (discussing how the Lochner era was 
concerned with protecting liberty and constantly battled with the government’s 
regulatory duty, as well as how government regulation is limited). 
 14  See generally McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010); District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 15  See GILLMAN, supra note 5, at 10, 11, 14–15; Strauss, supra note 5, at 375–76 
(explaining why Lochner was wrongly decided: first, the Court engaged in judicial 
activism; second, the Court chose to create rights not expressly granted by the 
Constitution; and third, the Court used freedom of contract to protect class interests 
and the laissez-faire economic capitalist system); see also Brief of Law Professors Erwin 
Chemerinsky and Adam Winkler as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 3, 
at *12–13, *15 (demonstrating the constitutional inconsistency in the position adopted 
by the Court in the Lochner era, and now repeated in its Heller and McDonald decisions); 
Geoffrey R. Stone, Citizens United and Conservative Judicial Activism, 2012 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 485, 490, 492–94, 499–500 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s conservative 
majority is troubling, because it is imparting its own policy choices through its opinions 
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1. Liberty 
Protecting individual liberty was one of the avowed goals of 
Lochner Era jurisprudence.16  While this goal is not necessarily 
inconsistent with the Constitution in the abstract, the concept of 
liberty was distorted by Lochnerism in order to preserve the rights of 
the economically and socially empowered to the detriment of the poor 
and powerless.17 
In the book Lochner v. New York: Economic Regulation on Trial, Paul 
Kens quotes the famous Darwinian principle “survival of the fittest” in 
connection with the mentality of the Lochner Era’s ideologies and 
goals.18  This is particularly relevant because “the fittest” that he is 
referring to are the wealthy, empowered, business owners who, 
through applied Lochner ideologies such as laissez-faire economics and 
Darwinian principles, furthered their power and wealth at the expense 
of the working class, who are powerless and poor.  Here, what is being 
argued for is individual liberty: the freedom to contract, free exchange, 
and no government interference.19  Freedom of contract and other 
constitutional law-based doctrines were applied to bolster common law 
doctrines such as caveat emptor—”let the buyer beware”—and 
undermine the ability to prevent the exploitation of workers or 
consumers.20 
 
instead of following precedent). 
 16  See Kens, supra note 8, at 411 (arguing that the Lochner court’s decision was based 
on “individualism,” which focuses on individual liberty). 
 17  See KENS, supra note 3, at 71–74.  There is a competing view of Lochner Era 
jurisprudence that frames it as being motivated by “a fear of government protective 
monopolistic behavior.”  GILLMAN, supra note 5, at 10, 11, 14–15.  However, as David E. 
Bernstein suggests in his article, “Gillman’s discussion of the police powers 
jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court during the Lochner era . . . exaggerates the 
role that concerns about class legislation played in that jurisprudence.  Rather . . . the 
basic motivation for Lochnerian jurisprudence was the Justices’ belief that Americans 
had fundamental unenumerated constitutional rights, and that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause protected those rights.”  David E. Bernstein, 
Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights 
Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 12 (2003).  
 18  KENS, supra note 3, at 75.  
 19  Id. at 74. 
 20  See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (concerning a 
federal law which prohibited the interstate shipment of products made by mixing milk 
with any fat, other than milk fat, to create a product imitating milk or cream).  Carolene 
Products violated the statute by mixing milk and coconut oil.  Although the law was 
challenged as an unconstitutional interference by Congress, the Supreme Court found 
that the federal government had legitimate interests in protecting the public from 
fraud and health threats and that Congress was not obliged to ignore evidence about 
the danger of a product.  The law was upheld.  This case is significant for Footnote 4, 
in which the Court recognized boundaries for the deference given the legislature: 1) 
if a law appears to violate the Bill of Rights on its face, 2) interference with political 
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This ideology was evident in the 1897 case Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 
which was the first case in which the United States Supreme Court 
recognized and emphasized the individual liberty to engage in free 
contract.21  Allgeyer concerned an act that prohibited citizens of the 
state, under open policy of marine insurance, from acquiring 
insurance from an out-of-state insurance company that had failed to 
comply with the state’s laws.22  The law prohibited anyone in the state 
from sending mail or telegraphs of any notice that described the 
property that was in the state.  The Court found that individual liberty 
encompasses the liberty of contract and held the act unconstitutional.23  
The Court continued applying this libertarian ideology throughout 
the Lochner Era to overrule government legislation and exploit the 
disempowered. 
Another example, which encompasses these Lochner ideologies 
that favor individual liberty to bolster the empowered at the expense 
of the disempowered, is the 1923 case of Adkins v. Children’s Hospital.24  
In Adkins, the Supreme Court overruled a federal statute that created 
a minimum wage for women and children working in the District of 
Columbia.25  The federal statute contained “language that could have 
served little purpose other than to help it along the legal gauntlet.”26  
That specific language was found in section twenty-three of the statute, 
which declared that “the purposes of the act are to protect women and 
minors of the District from conditions detrimental to their health and 
morals, resulting from wages which are inadequate to maintain a 
decent standard of living.”27  Despite this statute being enacted for the 
protection and well-being of women and children, which were 
vulnerable groups that needed protection at the time, the Court held 
that the freedom to contract was more important and would prevail.28  
Once again, the rights and interests of those in power, the wealthy and 
the employers of the workers, prevailed, and the empowered 
maintained their ability to exploit the vulnerable. 
The most infamous case displaying the Lochner Era ideologies of 
 
process, and 3) considerations into whether the law affected discrete and insular 
groups.  If a law breached these boundaries, the Court might step in. Adkins v. 
Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). 
 21  See KENS, supra note 3, at 191. 
 22  Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 578. 
 23  Id. at 593. 
 24  Adkins, 261 U.S. at 525. 
 25  See id. at 562; KENS, supra note 3, at 194. 
 26  KENS, supra note 3, at 174. 
 27  Id. 
 28  Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 561 (1923). 
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allowing powerful employers’ liberty of contract to supersede the 
needs of disadvantaged workers is the case that gave the era its name, 
Lochner v. New York.29  The case involved a man named Joseph Lochner, 
whose legal problems occurred when New York enacted the Bakershop 
Act, which limited the number of s per day and per week that 
employees could work.30  The limit was ten hours per day and sixty 
hours per week.31  Some of Lochner’s business practices were in 
violation of this Act.  “Mr. Lochner had coerced or allowed one of his 
bakers, Aman Schmitter to work more than 60 hours in a week or more 
than ten hours a day.”32  If Mr. Lochner had been convicted, he would 
have faced fines or imprisonment.33  This was not Lochner’s first 
violation of the law and he disliked the effects that the Act had on how 
he could lawfully conduct business, so he challenged the Act, claiming 
that it infringed on his liberty of freedom of contract.34  While the lower 
courts held that he had violated the law, the Supreme Court reversed 
their decisions and found the Act unconstitutional.35  This 
controversial ruling allowed for employers to continue exploiting 
vulnerable workers who had unequal bargaining power based on a 
libertarian ideology of freedom of contract. 
This same distorted application of liberty can be seen in the 
context of gun rights.  The Lochner Era goal of preserving the rights of 
the economically and socially empowered is acknowledged by Cornell 
throughout his book.36  For instance, in Nelson Lund’s description of 
the case, he emphasizes that the Plaintiffs came from “respectable 






 29  See KENS, supra note 3, at 88–94. 
 30  Id. at 89. 
 31  Id.; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52 (1905). 
 32  KENS, supra note 3, at 88–89. 
 33  Id. at 89. 
 34  Id.  
 35  Id. at 91–110. 
 36  See generally SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS 
AND THE ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA (2006). 
 37  Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, in THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT ON TRIAL: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER 148 
(Saul Cornell & Nathan Kozuskanich eds., 2013). 
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2. Federalism: States’ Rights 
Protecting principles of federalism by limiting the power of the 
national government is a core aspect of Lochner Era jurisprudence38 
that is mirrored in the current Court’s recent Second Amendment 
decisions.39  During the Lochner Era, the Court would frequently 
reference Tenth Amendment concerns to justify limiting the federal 
government’s power to regulate.40  These concerns were based on views 
of federalism that suggest that the national government cannot act 
most of the time. 
Today’s new Lochnerism uses the Second Amendment in a 
manner similar to how the Tenth Amendment was used in the Lochner 
Era as a basis for limiting the federal government’s power,41 and the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Due Process Clause as a basis for 
limiting state governments’ power.42  This same limiting of state power 
was seen in Lochner v. New York when the Court used the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to overrule New York’s state law 
that limited how many hours bakers could work per day and per week.43 
This limitation of the state’s power through the use of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was also seen in the case 
Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, in which the Court held a New York 
minimum wage law unconstitutional based on the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.44  The Court used the Constitution to 
limit both federal and state governmental powers. 
3. Limited Government 
Limiting government’s overall regulatory power was another goal 
of the Lochner Era.45  The activist courts of the Lochner Era were able to 
 
 38  See Strauss, supra note 5, at 376 (“During the Lochner era, the only 
constitutional principles that the Supreme Court enforced regularly and systematically 
were those that the New Deal discredited: freedom of contract, as in Lochner, and 
federalism-based limits on Congress’s power.”).  
 39  See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (holding that the Second 
Amendment applied to the states and not just the federal government); KENS, supra 
note 3, at 3.  
 40  See Strauss, supra note 5, at 376; KENS, supra note 3, at 3. 
 41  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 598–99 (2008). 
 42  See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 744. 
 43  See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52 (1905).  
 44  See Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 603 (1936). 
 45  See KENS, supra note 3, at 4, 71–74 (arguing that the values of the Lochner Era 
and cases, which involved substantive due process and liberty of contract, forced 
lawmakers to tailor reform statutes to meet the Court’s constricted definition of police 
powers).  The Lochner Era supported limiting government’s regulatory power.  
Furthermore, these Lochner cases gave the Court a veto power over state legislation that 
IMOUKHUEDE (DO NOT DELETE) 2/2/2017  8:19 PM 
338 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:329 
limit the government’s power by continually holding government 
legislation unconstitutional.  By doing this, the Court is able to “bypass 
the ballot and seek to press their political agenda in the courts.”46  The 
Court, by “usurp[ing]” the legislative function and the power of the 
people, has significantly limited government’s overall regulatory 
power.47  During the Lochner Era the concept of the “negative state” 
emerged as a mechanism to convince people that less government 
regulatory power was better.  The “negative state” referred to the 
government’s regulations in a negative perspective and connotation to 
promote the Lochner Era’s ideology that the government’s regulatory 
power should be very narrow and limited.48  The Court in the Lochner 
Era felt that any government interference with private property, free 
exchange, and liberty of contract were “pollutants” and, additionally, 
were ineffective at resolving problems.49 
Similar to the Lochner Era Court, the current Court’s specific 
limitation on the federal government is an attempt to mask a broader 
goal of limiting government regulatory power at every level of 
government.50 
B. Lochnerism’s Problems 
The Lochner Era’s goal of advancing liberty was a rhetorical cover 
for advancing the interests of those who aligned with the Court’s 
values.51  The value-based decision-making that characterized the 
Lochner Era is at odds with the concept of judicial restraint, which is an 
essential limitation on unelected judges.  As Alexander Bickel and 
others have described, the countermajoritarian difficulty that is 
inherent in a system that vests ultimate decision-making power as to 
“what the law is” in an unelected branch of government, requires 
fidelity to neutral principles.52  Simply espousing those neutral 
principles—liberty, limited government, and federalism—is 
insufficient in the face of inconsistent application. 
 
it had not had in the past. 
 46  See J. Harvie Wilkinson, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, in THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT ON TRIAL: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER 189 
(Saul Cornell & Nathan Kozuskanich eds., 2013).  
 47  Kens, supra note 8, at 412. 
 48  See KENS, supra note 3, at 71–72. 
 49  Id. at 74. 
 50  See id. at 73–74. 
 51  See Stone, supra note 15, at 485, 490, 492–94, 499–500 (arguing that the 
Supreme Court’s conservative majority is troubling because it is imparting its own 
policy choices through its opinions instead of following precedent). 
 52  See generally ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962). 
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1. Ignores Governmental Duty 
One hallmark of Lochnerism was its laissez-faire approach to 
justice that ignored the duties of government in favor of liberty.53  This 
is often discussed in the context of jurisprudence that is driven by 
laissez-faire economic theory.54  A broader laissez-faire approach to 
justice can be seen in Lochnerism’s general approach towards 
governmental duties.  The basic philosophy of reduced governmental 
regulations was applied in more than just the context of governmental 
regulation of the economy.55  During the Lochner Era, the Court struck 
down state and federal laws involving child labor, the insurance 
industry, the transportation industry, maximum hour limits on 
working, and the rights of laborers.56  Lochnerism’s broader laissez-
faire approach to the role of government can be seen as an allegiance 
to a form of anarchy where government’s role is to validate already 
existing power relations without concerning itself with enhancing 
justice.57 
2. Inconsistent, Value Based Decisions 
The inconsistent values that characterize Lochnerism can be seen 
in its failure to follow precedent.58  Although the Court espoused 
 
 53  See generally Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 545 (1923) (“The 
statute . . . under consideration is attacked upon the ground that it authorizes an 
unconstitutional interference with the freedom of contract included within the 
guaranties of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.  That the right to 
contract about one’s affairs is a part of the liberty of the individual protected by this 
clause, is settled by the decisions of this Court and is no longer open to question.”); 
KENS, supra note 3, at 70–74.  
 54  See Adkins, 261 U.S. at 560. 
 55  See Stone, supra note 15, at 490. 
 56  Id. at 490–91. 
 57  William L. Taylor, Equality as a Constitutional Concept, 47 MD. L. REV. 38, 41 
(1987).  Taylor argues that the notion that laws cannot change or correct for human 
behavior, recognized by President Eisenhower’s famous quote that “law cannot change 
the hearts and minds of men,” is an ideology that is consistent with the Lochner Era, 
because it means the law is ineffective at changing reality.  This view of law and justice 
was pervasive during the Lochner Era.  President Eisenhower’s quote is consistent with 
this Lochner Era view and resistance to the changes in the Civil Rights Era illustrate how 
this idea has continued to be applied long after the official end of Lochnerism.  
 58  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 637–38 (2008) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); GILLMAN, supra note 5, at 10, 11, 14–15 (arguing that the motivations of 
the current Court majority are often obscure and that the Roberts Court is deviating 
from precedent and revising the meaning of the Constitution to satisfy its own political 
agenda); Kiehl, supra note 5, at 1134–35 (discussing the established precedent of the 
state and federal courts regarding the Second Amendment prior to Heller and 
McDonald and arguing that those courts departed from precedent); Hatt, supra note 5, 
at 514 (arguing that the Court’s current interpretation of the Second Amendment is 
contrary to the amendment’s original purpose, which was to protect Americans’ ability 
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neutral principles of liberty, limited government, and federalism,59 it 
made rulings grounded in ideological beliefs and contrary to 
precedent.60 
Friedman pointed to the Court’s struggle with this 
countermajoritarian difficulty when he wrote, “[D]uring the Lochner 
Era, Supreme Court Justices failed to adhere to constitutional norms 
requiring deference to majoritarian decisions and inappropriately 
struck down laws by substituting their own views for those of legislative 
bodies.”61 
Thus, simply espousing neutral principles—here, liberty, limited 
government, and federalism62—is insufficient in the face of 
inconsistent application by the Court.  Friedman also described this 
problem in his article regarding the countermajoritarian difficulty and 
Lochner, where he quoted Dean William Trickett’s “extremely strongly 
worded attack on the courts,”63 which read: 
These nine men can quash the legislation of the 
representatives of ninety millions of people.  The time is at 
hand when they will be able to quash the legislation of the 
representatives of two hundred millions of people, though 
that legislation were unanimously enacted and unanimously 
approved by the people.64 
Justice Brandeis warned judges and justices that “we must be ever 
on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal principles.”65  
However, judicial activism and the deviation from precedent 
continued.  This was seen in Lochner, which is now widely viewed as 
incorrect and a disgrace because, as Brandeis warned, the Justices 
could not claim adequate legal support for their conclusion and 
actually were entrenched in their own controversial view of public 
policy. 
In a series of cases involving wages and work-hour laws, the Court 
 
to resist the tyranny of their federal government).  Heller, through holding that the 
Second Amendment protects one’s individual rights to bear arms for self-defense, led 
to limitations on the type of arms one could possess, which made the original purpose 
of the Second Amendment “unachievable.”  This individual rights self-defense 
argument is one which is predicated on the inconsistent values of Lochnerism. See also 
Schaerer, supra note 5, at 797–98; Strauss, supra note 5, at 375–86. 
 59  Strauss, supra note 5, at 376. 
 60  Id. at 376, 383, 386. 
 61  Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The 
Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1383 (2001).  
 62  Strauss, supra note 5, at 37. 
 63  Friedman, supra note 61, at 1443.  
 64  Id.  
 65  Wilkinson, supra note 46, at 190 (internal quotations omitted).  
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initially indicated concern that an important liberty—freedom to 
contract—was at stake and therefore such laws would be 
unconstitutional.  The “Brandeis Brief,” introduced by then-attorney 
and later Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, included extensive 
social science data and became the vehicle through which the Court 
was willing to create exceptions to its general rule.66  If it were limited 
to the context of overwhelming scientific evidence, this sort of 
inconsistency might be seen as jurisprudentially acceptable.  However, 
the Court’s further inconsistencies have nothing to do with the 
challenges of legal application and everything to do with the limits of 
Lochnerism’s laissez-faire philosophy of liberty when up against right-
wing social and political theory.67 
This practice of applying ideology regardless of precedent has 
also emerged in Heller, which is seen as “the modern incarnation of 
Lochner v. New York,” where the “Court overrode democratic judgments 
in favor of a dubious understanding of the Constitution.”68  In applying 
the Lochnerism characteristics, the Supreme Court struck down the 
District of Columbia’s gun control laws as a violation of the Second 
Amendment, and in doing so it reversed almost seventy years of settled 
precedent.69 
3. Hostile to Public Safety and Welfare Regulations 
Lochnerism consistently devalues public welfare in favor of flawed 
theories of liberty.70  Liberty under this perspective is forever in tension 
with public welfare, so that anything that is done to enhance the public 
welfare is viewed as eroding personal liberty.71  The previously 
 
 66  Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419–23 (1908).  
 67  Strauss, supra note 5, at 386. 
 68  Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, in THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT ON TRIAL: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER 256 
(Saul Cornell & Nathan Kozuskanich eds., 2013).  
 69  Cornell & Kozuskanich, supra note 5, at 1.  See generally United States v. Miller, 
307 U.S. 174 (1939); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); United States v. 
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (holding that the Second Amendment limits the 
power of the federal government and does not protect the right to keep and bear arms 
from interference by other individuals, and that the Second Amendment does not 
afford individuals rights to bear arms for purposes of self-preservation or defense that 
is not related to the militia or the common good). 
 70  See generally Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (overruling a 
federal statute that created a minimum wage for women and children working in the 
District of Columbia); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (invalidating a 
federal law aimed at prohibiting child labor); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  
These cases focus particularly on economic liberty and freedom of contract and are 
perfect examples of times when public welfare was devalued in favor of liberty. 
 71  See KENS, supra note 3, at 71 (“To laissez faire theorists, the chief threat to the 
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discussed 1923 case of Adkins v. Children Hospital, is one example of the 
Court ignoring the duties of the government and leaving the 
vulnerable susceptible to exploitation and hardships.72  Another 
Lochner Era example that demonstrates the Court upholding these 
laissez-faire economic ideologies at the expense of governmental 
duties, particularly the duty to protect children, is the case Hammer v. 
Dagenhart.73  Here, the Court invalidated a federal child labor law by 
resting its decision on a narrow reading of the Commerce Clause, 
which was based on the idea of the negative state and laissez-faire social 
Darwinism.74 
Recognizing the consistent devaluation of the public welfare at 
once reconciles the federalism-based inconsistencies of Lochnerism.  
Lochnerism was hostile to federal regulations because they 
undermined the Tenth Amendment rights of the States.  It was 
simultaneously hostile to state regulations, because they undermined 
freedom of contract, substantive due process, and related liberty 
concerns.75 
In sum, the Lochner Era Court superimposed libertarian 
philosophy onto constitutional law, and in so doing, failed to recognize 
and allow government to fulfill its constitutional duties. 
4. Liberty as Justification for Reduced Regulatory Power 
Under the Lochner Era approach, government regulations to 
improve the public welfare are in tension with liberty, so that there is 
a zero-sum binary relationship between liberty and welfare.76  Kens, in 
his book, explains that government regulations in the Lochner Era were 
seen as “pollutants” and that efforts to resolve economic problems 
through legislation were ineffective because they infringed on 
individuals’ liberty.77  Thus, there is a notion that freedom requires 
fewer regulations and laws; however, this is an overly simplistic view.  
 
pursuit of individual self-interest and consequently the progress of society was 
economic legislation.”).  
 72  See id. 
 73  Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); see KENS, supra note 3, at 172. 
 74  KENS, supra note 3, at 71–73 (discussing Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 
(1918)).  
 75  See id. (“To laissez-faire theorists, the chief threat to the pursuit of individual 
self-interest and consequently the progress of society was economic legislation.”).  
Such theorists believed that the role of government should be what is sometimes 
referred to as the “negative state,”  and they additionally envisioned a very limited 
governmental role from both the federal and state government leading to minimal 
government regulation.  See also Strauss, supra note 5, at 375–76. 
 76  See KENS, supra note 3, at 71.  
 77  Id. at 71–74. 
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One flaw in this theory is that a basic function of law is to structure 
institutions and frameworks for recognizing and protecting liberty.  We 
do not trade freedom for safety, but rather, we derive freedom from 
safety.  Government regulatory power can go further by way of 
enhancing liberty through regulations.78 
For example, Kens examines how liberty and freedom from 
oppression can be enhanced through government regulation.  Kens 
explains that when a person works fourteen-hour workdays they are 
too tired to read, worry about social or political issues, or have a proper 
family life.79  He says: 
[W]orking from sunrise to sunset was incompatible with the 
responsibilities of citizenship.  Long hours left no time for 
necessary mental improvement and cultivation, especially 
given that the vast majority of industrial laborers began 
working as children.  Furthermore, long workdays left even 
educated workers insufficient time to consider public 
questions or gather with others for discussion of the issues of 
the day.80 
Thus, Kens explains that while government regulations on 
employees’ work hours, conditions, and pay can enhance the worker’s 
life immeasurably, removing those regulations in exchange for a 
liberty that they otherwise would never have creates the threat of 
unemployment, a very “tangible disaster.”81  Furthermore, Kens 
explains that when employees and workers were left with such unequal 
bargaining power, the disabling effects of unemployment meant they 
did not truly have the liberty to contract.  Rather, the contract between 
the employer and an employee was really a sham because: 
Even in legal theory a contract occurs only when the parties 
reach agreement by bargaining “at arm’s length”—that is, to 
some extent each party possesses a similar amount of 
bargaining power.  But now when a worker takes a job . . . the 
employer sets the terms.  Testifying before the Massachusetts 
legislature, one advocate observed that “an empty stomach 
can make no contracts.  The workers assent but they do not 
consent.”  From this some were able to conclude that without 
a legal limit on the length of the workday, employees simply 
delivered themselves into bondage for a day’s wages.82 
As a result, American society holds an ideology and belief that 
 
 78  See id. at 173–74. 
 79  See id. at 16–17. 
 80  Id. at 19. 
 81  Id. at 16–17. 
 82  See KENS, supra note 3, at 19.  
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pulls it between living in a world of theory and another in practice.83  
We cherish this belief that we live in a world where liberty is 
fundamental, where everyone’s liberty is protected; however, without 
government protection through law, discrete and insular minorities 
and other classes of people who are not wealthy or otherwise powerful, 
will not enjoy liberty.84  Thus, minimum wage and employee work 
hours are just a few examples of areas where informational 
discrepancies and disparities in bargaining power are corrected by way 
of regulation to enable citizens to make informed choices in areas such 
as employment, services, and products they purchase. 
5. Stare Decisis: Inconsistent with Precedent 
Violating stare decisis is a hallmark of Lochnerism and was 
instrumental to its ultimate failure.85  In explaining why Lochner was 
wrong and what led to the demise of its interpretation, David Strauss 
emphasizes that Lochner is one of the great anti-precedents of the 
twentieth century, a characteristic for which it is well known.86  When 
stare decisis is not followed and inconsistent constitutional decisions are 
made, the Court’s institutional legitimacy erodes.87 
 
 83  Id. at 20. 
 84  See generally id. 
 85  See District of Columbia. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 637–38 (2008) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); Kiehl, supra note 5, at 1134–35; Hatt, supra note 58, at 506 (arguing that 
Heller, through holding that the Second Amendment protects one’s individual rights 
to bear arms for self-defense, led to limitations on the type of arms one could possess, 
which made the original purpose of the Second amendment “unachievable”); 
Schaerer, supra note 5, at 797; David Yassky, The Second Amendment: Structure, History 
and Constitutional Change, 99 MICH. L. REV. 588, 589–90, 613, 615–16, 617 (2000) 
(explaining the pre-Heller view that individual rights to bear arms are not derived from 
the Constitution and that the new approach ignores the prefatory clause and is 
implausible); John Zulkey, The Obsolete Second Amendment: How Advances in Arms 
Technology Have Made the Prefatory Clause Incompatible With Public Policy, 2010 U. ILL. J.L. 
TECH. & POL’Y 213, 213–14, 218 (explaining that the prefatory clause establishes a 
collective right for a well-regulated militia: these propositions were endorsed by Miller, 
and the Roberts Court’s reinterpretation left this clause as a nullity); Amanda C. 
Dupree, Comment, A Shot Heard ‘Round the District: The District of Columbia Circuit Puts 
a Bullet in the Collective Right Theory of the Second Amendment, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 413, 415–18 (2008) (arguing that the collective rights theory was established 
precedent and that the Court departed from it in Heller when it held it was an 
individual right); Brief of NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) 
(No. 07-290), 2008 WL 157192 *6–7 (arguing that the Second Amendment does not 
protect an individual right to possess or use arms outside of the context of a lawfully 
organized militia, and that finding otherwise departs from longstanding tradition). 
 86  Strauss, supra note 5, at 373. 
 87  See KENS, supra note 3, at 148 (arguing that decisions like Lochner ultimately 
erode respect for courts and the law); Thomas W. Merrill, Can Originalism be Reconciled 
with Precedent?: A Symposium on Stare Decisis: Originalism, Stare Decisis, and the Promotion of 
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Wilkinson’s essay in Saul Cornell’s book warns that caution should 
be taken when the judiciary is engaging in their “interpretive task” 
because they are unelected, and he explains that this is “periodically 
forgotten . . . at the expense of long-term institutional respect.”88  This 
erosion of legitimacy is a very real concern that is also recognized by 
Kens when he discusses this very phenomenon occurring in Lochner.89  
The post-2008 gun rights decisions of District of Columbia v. Heller and 
McDonald v. City of Chicago also overrule past precedent.90  Cornell 
highlights that the Supreme Court overruled almost seventy years of 
settled precedent when it ruled on the Second Amendment gun rights 
involving the District Court of Columbia’s gun control laws in Heller.91 
III. POST-HELLER SECOND AMENDMENT GUN RIGHTS 
The Heller decision of 2008 and the McDonald decision of 2010 
reframed Second Amendment doctrine as primarily a self-defense 
concern—an individual liberty.92  This libertarian perspective on the 
right to bear arms recasts it as a freedom with virtually no relationship 
to the Second Amendment’s prefatory clause.93  Individual liberty thus 
 
Judicial Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 275–79, 281, 287 (2005) (explaining the 
importance of stare decisis and its impact on judicial restraint).  
 88  Wilkinson, supra note 46, at 190.  
 89  See KENS, supra note 3, at 148–49.  
 90  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).  See Kiehl, supra note 5, at 1134–35; 
Hatt, supra note 5, at 506 (discussing the Court’s departure from precedent and stare 
decisis); Schaerer, supra note 5, at 797; Strauss, supra note 5, at 378–79.  See also GILLMAN, 
supra note 5, at 10–11, 14–15. 
 91  Cornell & Kozuskanich, supra note 5, at 1.  
 92  See LAURENCE TRIBE & JOSHUA MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: THE ROBERTS COURT 
AND THE CONSTITUTION (2014); CRAIG R. WHITNEY, LIVING WITH GUNS: A LIBERAL’S CASE 
FOR THE SECOND AMENDMENT ix–x (2012) (noting that the conservative majority of the 
Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to 
bear and keep firearms for purposes of self-defense and other limited legal purposes); 
Kiehl, supra note 5, at 1132–34 (noting that the Supreme Court endorsed the collective 
rights view of the Second Amendment for nearly a century, given that in Heller and 
McDonald the Supreme Court held for the first time that the Second Amendment 
protects an individual’s right to keep and bear arms, and that the Second Amendment 
applies against the states through the doctrine of incorporation); Lewis M. Wasserman, 
Gun Control on College and University Campuses in the Wake of District of Columbia v. 
Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 19 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 6–7 (2011) (noting 
that Heller established for the first time that the Second Amendment protects an 
individual’s right to possess a firearm and use it for lawful purposes such as self-defense 
within the home, striking down longstanding precedent, and for the very first time 
invalidating a federal firearm regulation).  
 93  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008) (“The prefatory 
clause does not suggest that preserving the militia was the only reason Americans 
valued the ancient right; most undoubtedly thought it was even more important for 
self-defense and hunting.  But the threat that the new Federal Government would 
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becomes the rhetorical vehicle, the euphemism for reduced 
government regulatory power.94 
The scope of federal power to regulate guns is narrowed by these 
decisions, but there remains space for significant gun control.95  The 
problem is that given the major shift away from government regulatory 
power, federal gun control advocacy has been chilled.  This chilling of 
gun control advocacy can be seen as undermining public safety, even 
as the Court claims to champion individual rights.96  In the face of mass 
shootings and targeted killings of Blacks and other minorities, some 
troubling questions arise regarding whose rights matter to the Court. 
State power to regulate guns suffers from a similar chilling effect 
through the McDonald decision.  Subsequent decisions have redefined 
the scope of the Second Amendment limitations on state gun control 
laws.97  While, just as in the context of the federal regulatory limits, the 
Court proclaims a protection of individual rights in the form of liberty, 
this once more raises the question of whose liberty is protected and 
why.  The public safety consequences of the new limitations on state 
gun control laws are perhaps of even greater consequence given that, 
traditionally, most gun control regulation has been done by the states. 
 
destroy the citizens’ militia by taking away their arms was the reason that right—unlike 
some other English rights—was codified in a written Constitution.”); Zulkey, supra 
note 85, at 213–14, 218; Yassky, supra note 85, at 589–90, 613, 615–17. 
 94  See Steven J. Heyman, The Conservative-Libertarian Turn in First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 231, 251 (2014) (contending that the Conservative-
Libertarian majority of the Supreme Court interprets the Constitution as a charter of 
negative rights that limits the welfare state and that as a result individuals have no 
affirmative rights to public services or benefits).  Heyman cites to Judge Richard A. 
Posner: “the Constitution is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties. . . .  The 
men who wrote the Bill of Rights were not concerned that government might do too 
little for the people but that it might do too much to them.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment, adopted in 1868 at the height of laissez-faire thinking, sought to protect 
Americans from oppression by state government, not to secure them basic 
governmental services.”  Id.  
 95  See Kiehl, supra note 5, at 1132, 1138 (explaining that the majority in Heller and 
the plurality in McDonald did not automatically invalidate all gun regulations, but 
limited their holdings to the individual right to self-defense (presumptively only at 
home), recognizing that many longstanding and traditional gun regulations will 
remain valid).  
 96  See id. 
 97  Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1148, 1179 (9th Cir. 2014); Moore 
v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935–36, 942 (7th Cir. 2012); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 
F.3d 684, 689–90 (7th Cir. 2011); Gowder v. City of Chicago, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 
1126 (N.D. Ill. 2012); Michael B. de Leeuw, The (New) New Judicial Federalism: State 
Constitutions and the Individual Rights to Bear Arms, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1449, 1466–67 
(2012) (noting that in the wake of Heller the federal government has been involved in 
extensive litigation related to its gun-control regulations, despite Justice Scalia’s 
assertion that “long-standing” regulations were presumptively reasonable; the lack of 
a definite judicial review standard has opened the floodgates of litigation).  
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A. Reinterpretations of Doctrine 
Before 2008, the Court’s interpretation of the Second 
Amendment did not include an individual right to bear arms, but 
rather a collective right.98  This collective right was framed in terms of 
the “well-regulated militia” that is referenced in the first few words of 
the Amendment.99  This portion of the Amendment, which is 
frequently referred to as the prefatory clause, was universally 
recognized as important.100  It was so well-recognized that even outlaws 
and domestic terrorist organizations sought to legitimize themselves by 
clothing themselves in the language of the prefatory clause’s qualified 
protection by claiming to be “militia” or militia groups.101 
The Court has now reinterpreted the prefatory clause of the 
Second Amendment so that the collective militia right is no longer part 
of the framework for the right to bear arms.102  According to Michael 
 
 98  See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 
U.S. 275, 281–82 (1897) (noting that the Bill of Rights embodies certain guarantees 
and immunities that are subject to well-recognized exceptions; for example, the right 
of the people to keep and bear arms enshrined in the Second Amendment is not 
infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons); Miller v. Texas, 153 
U.S. 535, 539 (1894) (holding that a state law forbidding the carrying of dangerous 
weapons was not an unconstitutional violation of the Second Amendment); Presser v. 
Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886) (holding that a state’s Military Code forbidding all able-
bodied men, except military members, from associating or parading with arms without 
a license from the governor does not violate the Second Amendment); United States 
v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (holding that the individual right to bear arms is 
not granted by the Constitution and that the purpose of the Second Amendment is to 
restrict the powers of the national government from infringing upon the collective-
militia state rights); CORNELL, supra note 36, at 202, 204 (“The emphasis in Miller was 
on bearing arms in the militia, not on the right of the states to maintain their militias. 
One thing was clear, the Court rejected the lower court’s anomalous individual rights 
reading of the amendment. . . . Subsequent federal court decisions interpreted Miller 
through the same lens as contemporary law reviews used to understand the case. The 
Second Amendment protected a collective right tied to participation in the militia.”); 
Kiehl, supra note 5, at 1134; Zulkey, supra note 85, at 213–14, 218. 
 99  U.S. CONST. amend. II.  See also Zulkey, supra note 85, at 213–14, 218.  
 100  Joyce Lee Malcolm, Brief of the Cato Institute and History Professor Joyce Lee Malcolm 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, in THE SECOND AMENDMENT ON TRIAL: CRITICAL 
ESSAYS ON DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER 50–51 (Saul Cornell & Nathan Kozuskanich 
eds., 2013) (discussing the prefatory clause and its importance); Jack Rakove et al., 
Brief of Amici Curiae Jack N. Rakove, Saul Cornell, David T. Konig, Lois Schwoerer et al. in 
Support of Petitioners, in THE SECOND AMENDMENT ON TRIAL: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON DISTRICT 
OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER 62 (Saul Cornell & Nathan Kozuskanich eds., 2013); Reva B. 
Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, in THE SECOND 
AMENDMENT ON TRIAL: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER 83, 85 (Saul 
Cornell & Nathan Kozuskanich eds., 2013). 
 101  See Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 229 (2008). 
 102  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 637–38, 642–43 (2008) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting); MARK V. TUSHNET, OUT OF RANGE: WHY THE CONSTITUTION CAN’T END 
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Waldman, Justice Scalia in his effort to explain the Framers’ original 
intent completely ignored the prefatory clause of the Second 
Amendment:103 
Scalia does not seek to explain the Framers’ original 
intent . . . .  The Second Amendment, he begins, “is naturally 
divided into two parts: its prefatory clause and its operative 
clause.”  But he has a surprising way to deal with that 
prefatory clause, the homage to the “well regulated militia 
being necessary to the security of a free state,” so important 
to the Framers.  He skips right over it.  Scalia simply lops off the 
first half of the amendment, just as in the bowdlerized quote 
in the NRA headquarters lobby.  What counts is the second 
half.  This is the right way to read the amendment, Scalia’s 
opinion explains, because that is the way people in the past 
used to read constitutional provisions.104 
In doing so, the Court has created an individual right to bear 
arms, and only limited that right with the phrase “weapons in common 
use,” a phrase that appears nowhere in the Constitution.105  The Court 
has also indicated a distinction between the scope of this expanded 
Second Amendment right under federal as compared to state law. 
The new reinterpretation of the prefatory clause uses liberty as 
the facial justification for what is actually a non-constitutionally based 
agenda to reduce the regulatory power of government.  The prefatory 
clause reinterpretation is a departure from precedent that is 
unacceptable in light of concepts of stare decisis, as well as pragmatic 
concerns regarding safety.  In so doing, the Court undermines a 
necessary component to liberty: public safety. 
1. The Prefatory Clause Departed from Precedent 
The Court’s recent decisions are a significant departure from 
precedent.106  Prior to 2008, gun rights were viewed as collective—a 
 
THE BATTLE OVER GUNS 164 (2007) (explaining how the reinterpreted prefatory clause 
of the Second Amendment no longer pertains to a collective militia but to individual 
rights, which follows a libertarian perspective on the right to bear arms and invalidates 
the existence of the prefatory clause); Zulkey, supra note 85, at 213–14, 218; Yassky, 
supra note 85, at 589–90, 613, 615–16, 617 (explaining the pre-Heller view that an 
individual right to bear arms is not derived from the Constitution and that the new 
approach ignores the prefatory clause and is implausible).  
 103  See MICHAEL WALDMAN, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: A BIOGRAPHY 121 (2014).  
 104  Id. (emphasis in original).  
 105  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 618–26. 
 106  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 637–38 (Stevens, J., dissenting); United States v. Miller, 
307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 282 (1897); Miller v. 
Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); United States v. 
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); Cornell & Kozuskanich, supra note 5, at 1 (explaining 
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militia right.107  Zulkey suggests that the prefatory clause creates a 
collective right for a well-regulated militia, but Heller and McDonald 
reinterpreted the Second Amendment to instead confer an individual 
right unconnected to the militia, and in doing so left the prefatory 
clause without any meaning.108  Yassky explains that the pre-Heller view 
does not confer an individual right to bear arms, and that a right 
unconnected to the militia is not derived from the Constitution.109 
For instance, in Miller, the Supreme Court held that the Second 
Amendment did not protect guns unrelated to military purposes.110 
Until Heller, Miller was the only Supreme Court decision discussing 
the Second Amendment in detail.111  In Miller, the defendants were 
indicted for violating the National Firearms Act of 1934 by possessing 
a sawed-off shotgun.112  The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the 
statute.113  The Court reasoned as follows: 
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that 
possession or use of a “shotgun having a barrel of less than 
eighteen inches in length” at this time has some reasonable 
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well 
regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment 
guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.114  
Certainly, it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is 
any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use 
could contribute to the common defense.115 
This militia-based concept of the right to bear arms tied the 
Second Amendment to a governmental duty—the creation and 
 
that the Supreme Court struck down the District of Columbia’s gun control laws as a 
violation of the Second Amendment and that doing so reversed almost seventy years 
of settled precedent); Kiehl, supra note 5, at 1134–35 (discussing the established 
precedent of the state and federal courts regarding the Second Amendment prior to 
Heller and McDonald and arguing that because those holdings departed from 
precedent, it is therefore evident that subsequent courts do have a legitimate fear of 
overstepping constitutional limits). 
 107  See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178–79 (1939); Cornell & Kozuskanich, 
supra note 5, at 7–9 (explaining that for most of the twentieth century the dominant 
judicial and scholarly view of the Second Amendment was that it was a collective right 
of the states to maintain a well-regulated militia and a right of citizens to keep and 
bear those arms needed to meet their civic obligation to participate in a well-regulated 
militia). 
 108  Zulkey, supra note 85, at 213–14, 218. 
 109  Yassky, supra note 85, at 589–90, 613, 615–17. 
 110  Miller, 307 U.S. at 178. 
 111  Cornell & Kozuskanich, supra note 5, at 7–9.  
 112  Miller, 307 U.S. at 175. 
 113  Id. at 183. 
 114  Id. at 177. 
 115  Id. at 178.  
IMOUKHUEDE (DO NOT DELETE) 2/2/2017  8:19 PM 
350 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:329 
maintenance of a well-regulated militia for the protection of a free 
state.116 
In Heller, the plaintiffs brought suit to challenge the District of 
Columbia’s restrictive gun control regulations involving both a 
handgun ban and a safe-storage regulation.117  The Supreme Court 
recognized for the first time that the Second Amendment conferred 
an individual right to bear arms that was unconnected to the militia or 
military service.118 
As a result, the Supreme Court held that the Washington, D.C. 
regulations violated the Second Amendment.119  In coming to this 
holding the Court “failed to respect legislative judgments; and 
reject[ed] the principles of federalism.”120  The Supreme Court 
disregarded precedent, and imputed its own goals of establishing and 
preserving liberty and limiting government power.  As of this writing, 
since Heller, there have been over 1,090 challenges to gun laws or gun 
prosecutions that have undermined lawmaker’s ability to regulate 
guns.121 
As Stephen Kiehl summarizes, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the 
plaintiffs challenged a Chicago ordinance that prohibited possession 
of a firearm unless there was a valid registration certificate, and the 
ordinance forbade the issuance of such a certificate for most 
handguns.122  Here, the Court held that the scope of the handgun 
prohibitions amounted to an effective ban on handgun possession and 
that the ban was unconstitutional.123  The Court incorporated Heller’s 
Second Amendment holding that there is an individual right to bear 
arms for self-defense.124  However, here the court extended the right’s 
application to the state and local governments.125  This effectively 
 
 116  See generally U.S. CONST. amend. II.  
 117  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 574–76 (2008); see also Lund, supra 
note 37, at 148–49.  
 118  Heller, 554 U.S. at 619–20; Lund, supra note 37, at 148. 
 119  Heller, 554 U.S. at 635; Lund, supra note 37, at 149. 
 120  Heller, 554 U.S. at 679 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Wilkinson, supra note 46, 
at 190. 
 121  Protecting Strong Gun Laws: The Supreme Court Leaves Lower Court Victories 
Untouched, L. CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE (Aug. 2, 2016), 
http://smartgunlaws.org/protecting-strong-gun-laws-the-supreme-court-leaves-lower-
court-victories-untouched/.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 679 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Cornell 
& Kozuskanich, supra note 5, at 1.  
 122  Kiehl, supra note 5, at 1139 (summarizing McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 
U.S. 742, 750 (2010)). 
 123  Id. 
 124  McDonald, 561 U.S. at 791. 
 125  Cornell & Kozuskanich, supra note 5, at 3.  
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limited regulatory power.  McDonald upheld the ruling in Heller, which 
departed from precedent, and supported the same ideologies and 
goals of promoting individual liberty at the expense of unjustifiably 
limiting government power.  The scope of federal power to regulate 
guns is narrowed by these decisions, but there remains space for 
significant gun control.126 
2. Weapons in Common Use 
While weapons in common use cannot be barred completely, 
some regulation appears to still be possible even under today’s 
expanded protection of gun rights.127  The “weapons in common use” 
limitation allows the government to continue to enforce laws regarding 
rocket launchers, bazookas, and other weapons that are not in 
common use.128 
 
 126  See Kiehl, supra note 5, at 1138–39. 
 127  See Schaerer, supra note 5, at 800, 828 (explaining that there are many 
dangerous military-grade arms that can be regulated and prohibited, because they 
would fall outside the protection of the Second Amendment and were not “bearable” 
or would not be considered as lineal descendants from weapons of the Framers era 
when the Amendment was implemented).  The relevant time in the common-use 
inquiry, as articulated in Miller and adopted by Heller (i.e., whether a weapon is “in 
common use at the time”), is the present time rather than the time that the Second 
Amendment (for federal gun laws) or the Fourteenth Amendment (for state and local 
gun laws) was adopted.  Even Justice Breyer understood Scalia’s holding to be mistaken 
because he construed the Second Amendment this way: “The Second Amendment 
should protect weapons that can be fairly traced back to those weapons in common 
use at the time relevant constitutional amendments were adopted—that is, the Second 
Amendment should protect the ‘lineal descendants’ of commonly used Framing-era 
weapons—rather than, as Justice Scalia suggested, weapons in common use at some 
ever-changing ‘present’ time.” Id. at 801.  See also Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 
784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015) (recognizing that the Second Amendment does not 
automatically imperil every law regulating firearms, and holding that a city ordinance 
prohibiting the possession, sale, or manufacture of semi-automatic assault weapons 
and large-capacity magazines did not violate the Second Amendment), cert. denied, 136. 
S. Ct. 447 (2015); N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(applying intermediate scrutiny and upholding laws prohibiting possession of certain 
semiautomatic weapons, assault rifles with military-style features, and large-capacity 
magazines), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2486 (2016); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 431–32 
(3d Cir. 2013) (holding that a state law requiring applicants to establish a “justifiable 
need” to be allowed to carry a handgun in public for purposes of self-defense did not 
violate the Second Amendment because it is a “presumptively lawful,” “longstanding” 
regulation); People v. Garvin, 994 N.E.2d 1076, 1080, 1085 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) 
(holding that a state statute prohibiting possession of ammunition for unlawful use of 
weapons by felons did not violate the Second Amendment); State v. Craig, 807 N.W.2d 
453, 461–62 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (applying intermediate scrutiny and upholding a 
state law prohibiting persons convicted of a crime of violence from possessing a 
firearm); Kiehl, supra note 5, at 1138. 
 128  See Friedman, 784 F.3d at 406–07; N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 804 F.3d at 269; 
Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (upholding 
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The Court currently recognizes that other weapons that do not 
qualify as being in common use include armor-piercing bullets and 
assault weapons.129  However, the use of this phrase begs the question 
of what the legal standard is for whether a weapon should be 
recognized as being in common use, and whether it is possible for a 
weapon to transition into that category.130 
A notable criticism of the “weapons in common use” premise 
endorsed by Justice Scalia in Heller, comes from Allen Rostron, who 
states that: 
Justice Scalia also indicated that the Second Amendment’s 
protection does not extend to all types of guns.  Instead, the 
Amendment merely guarantees a right to have the types of 
weapons commonly used by Americans for lawful, 
nonmilitary purposes such as self-defense . . . .  Applying the 
“common use” requirement, Justice Scalia unequivocally 
found that handguns qualify for protection because they “are 
the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-
defense in the home.”  Moreover, Scalia suggested that 
machine guns are also outside the scope of the Second 
Amendment’s protection because they are not in common 
use among American civilians.  At the oral argument in the 
Heller case, Justice Scalia stated even more clearly that he 
thinks machine guns are too unusual to qualify for Second 
Amendment protection.  Even if more than one hundred 
 
prohibition on semi-automatic rifles and large-capacity magazines because the 
intermediate scrutiny test was met when the district court demonstrated the existence 
of a substantial relationship between such a prohibition and achieving the important 
governmental interest of protecting public safety); Schaerer, supra note 5, at 828 
(discussing bazookas and machine guns and how they may trace their lineal 
descendants to cannons which were not in common use by individuals for lawful 
purposes during the era when the Second Amendment was enacted). 
 129  See Cornell & Kozuskanich, supra note 5, at 13–14 (explaining that, according 
to the holding in Heller, legislatures may ban military style assault weapons because 
they do not fall in the “weapons of common use” category; however, legislatures cannot 
ban handguns).  It is essential to see the problematic distinction from how the Framers 
meant weapons of common use and initially applied it to the Second Amendment and 
how that changed as a result of the radical holdings in Heller and McDonald.  If Congress 
applied this notion to the Founding era it would have meant that Congress could have 
prohibited the militia’s muskets but not dueling pistols.  This is very “hard to reconcile 
with the preamble’s reference to a well-regulated militia or the era’s history.”  Id.  
Surely what should be protected are the lineal descendants of weapons used for militia 
purposes and, an example may be found in the Federal Militia Act of 1792, which 
required citizens to own muskets not handguns.  Id. 
 130  See Schaerer, supra note 5, at 800; Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the 
Third Battle Over the Second Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703 (2012) (analyzing 
Justice Breyer’s dissent and criticizing the “weapons in common use” argument of the 
majority and how the dicta regarding presumptively valid regulations contradicts the 
heart of the Court’s reasoning). 
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thousand Americans legally own machine guns, they still 
represent only a small fraction of the Nation’s population, 
and therefore Scalia believes those weapons are “quite 
unusual” and too uncommon to receive the Second 
Amendment’s protection.  Many logical objections to Justice 
Scalia’s common use approach spring readily to mind.  
Although it makes good sense not to recognize a right to 
possess extraordinarily dangerous weapons, it is more 
difficult to see why a gun should fall outside the scope of the 
right to keep and bear arms merely because it is uncommon.  
If a weapon was widely used and originally understood to be 
within the scope of the right to keep and bear arms, why 
should it lose its constitutional protection merely because the 
number of its users dwindles over the years?  In addition, 
Scalia’s approach gives governments an incentive to ban new 
types of weapons as soon as they appear, so that they never 
become common enough to receive constitutional 
protection.131 
While Scalia’s approach does allow for limitations of some 
weapons, his standard of “common use” or popularity of a weapon, is 
troubling. 
B. Federal Regulatory Limits 
Despite the purported limitations of Heller, its language regarding 
gun rights has public policy consequences that resound beyond the 
core constitutional issue.  The public ethos regarding rights has now 
shifted to be more liberty-oriented rather than duty bound.132  Federal, 
state, and local governments are now reluctant to pass new gun 
regulations for fear of running afoul of what is effectively the Court’s 
revised Second Amendment.133 
The reluctance to address gun control flows from confusion 
regarding what can be regulated by the federal government, and an 
unrecognized or ignored tension regarding individual rights.  The 
tension involves the right to bear arms versus the right of individuals 
 
 131  Rostron, supra note 130, at 710–12.  
 132  See Heyman, supra note 94, at 251. 
 133  See Philip J. Cook et al., Gun Control After Heller: Threats and Sideshows from a 
Social Welfare Perspective, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1042 (2009) (“Second Amendment 
doctrine might deter innovative regulatory responses to the problem of gun violence.  
The threat of litigation may inhibit useful policy experimentation ranging from 
personalized firearms technology and the microstamping of shell casings, to pre-
market review of gun design, social-cost taxation, gun-owner insurance requirements, 
and beyond.”).  
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to safety in their “persons, houses, papers, and effects.”134  The 
confusion regarding the scope of constitutionally legitimate federal 
regulation and the Court ignoring the constitutional duty of the 
federal government to protect public safety have also compromised 
individual liberty. 
This section will proceed to first examine what is currently 
regulated, then consider the question of individual rights that are 
protected, and finally will address the consequences to public safety 
flowing from the current Court doctrine and federal reluctance to 
enact meaningful gun control in the shadow of the actual and 
perceived doctrine.135 
1. What Can Be Regulated by Federal Government 
Heller held that the federal law in Washington, D.C. was 
unconstitutional because it unduly burdened a newly recognized 
Second Amendment right of an individual to keep and bear firearms 
for lawful purposes.136  The Court held that a statute that banned 
handgun possession and that required that firearms kept in homes be 
unloaded and disassembled, violated the Second Amendment.137  The 
Court limited the scope of this rule to allow complete regulation of 
weapons that are not in common use.138  Justice Scalia wrote for the 
majority as follows: 
Like most rights, the right secured by the Second 
Amendment is not unlimited.  From Blackstone through the 
19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely 
explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any 
weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for 
whatever purpose.  For example, the majority of the 19th-
century courts to consider the question held that 
prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful 
under the Second Amendment or state analogues.  Although 
we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today 
 
 134  U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 135  See Cook et al., supra note 133, at 1042 (“Second Amendment doctrine might 
deter innovative regulatory responses to the problem of gun violence.  The threat of 
litigation may inhibit useful policy experimentation ranging from personalized 
firearms technology and the microstamping of shell casings, to pre-market review of 
gun design, social-cost taxation, gun-owner insurance requirements, and beyond.”); 
TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 92, at 158 (“Until late 2012, a combination of partisan politics 
and pro-gun public opinion thwarted many efforts to pass laws that sought to reduce 
violence by limiting access to guns.”). 
 136  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 137  Id. 
 138  Id. at 627. 
IMOUKHUEDE (DO NOT DELETE) 2/2/2017  8:19 PM 
2017] GUN RIGHTS AND THE NEW LOCHNERISM 355 
of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our 
opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding 
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the 
mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in 
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or 
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the 
commercial sale of arms.139 
Despite this freedom to regulate weapons not in common use, 
federal laws fall far short of establishing total bans on guns and 
ammunition that fall under the category of assault weapons. 
While some states have very stringent gun regulations, other states 
favor a less strict firearm regulation scheme.  These variations create 
conflict, specifically when the federal government attempts to pass 
meaningful national firearms regulations.140 
Stephen Kiehl asserts that according to Justice Scalia’s reasoning, 
not all traditionally upheld gun regulations will meet constitutional 
muster.  However, the door as to their validity remains open, and the 
Court appears to suggest something less than a strict scrutiny test.141  
Kiehl asserts that: 
[Justice Scalia’s] extraordinary admission suggests that much 
of the twentieth century case law on gun regulations remains 
valid precedent, even under an individual rights 
interpretation of the Second Amendment.  In the cases 
Justice Scalia referred to, the courts upheld regulations that 
ban the possession of machineguns made after 1986, firearms 
by people subject to a domestic violence order, pipe bombs 
and sawed-off shotguns, as well as regulations requiring the 
registration of guns, requiring a permit to carry a concealed 
weapon, and banning felons from possessing firearms.142 
The problem is that given the major shift away from government 
regulatory power, federal gun control advocacy has been chilled.143  
 
 139  Id. at 626–27 (internal citations omitted).  
 140  See TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 92, at 159; Stacey L. Sobel, The Tsunami of Legal 
Uncertainty: What’s a Court to do Post-McDonald?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 489, 509 
(2012) (“A number of court decisions have analyzed presumptively valid regulations 
concerning felons, mentally ill individuals, and sensitive places.  Some courts hearing 
cases involving felons’ firearms rights have utilized specific standards of review, while 
others have used the categorical exemptions of Heller and McDonald to dispose of the 
cases based on the felony status of the individual asserting their Second Amendment 
right.”).  
 141  Kiehl, supra note 5, at 1132, 1138. 
 142  Id. at 1162.  
 143  See De Leeuw, supra note 97, at 1466–67 (noting that, in the wake of Heller, the 
federal government has been involved in extensive litigation related to its gun-control 
regulations, despite Justice Scalia’s assertion that “long-standing” regulations were 
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This can be seen as undermining public safety even as the Court 
proclaims to champion individual rights.  For example, in the district 
court case of Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence v. Brownback, an 
organization advocating for reducing gun violence nationwide, 
challenged the constitutionality of the Kansas Second Amendment 
Act, which prohibited the application of some federal firearm 
regulations within the state of Kansas.144  Defendants argued that the 
organization lacked standing and moved to dismiss.145  The District 
Court agreed, holding that absent an immediate harm or impending 
injury, based on hypothetical increased risk of future gun violence, the 
declaratory action lacked merit, and granted defendant’s motion.146  
Although, this decision was ostensibly based in a justiciability concern, 
in light of mass shootings and targeted killings, this begs some 
troubling questions regarding whose rights matter to the Court.147 
2. Individual Rights Protected, but Whose? 
The Court’s hostility to federal gun control laws has been building 
for some time, but was initially viewed as purely based in federalism 
concerns.148  The conservative-libertarian majority of the Supreme 
Court advocated for protecting individual liberties by imposing limits 
on the federal government.  For instance, in United States v. Lopez, the 
Rehnquist Court struck down a federal law that banned the possession 
of a gun within 1,000 feet of a school.149  The Court, using the 
 
presumptively reasonable; the lack of a definite judicial review standard has opened 
the floodgates of litigation); Kiehl, supra note 5, at 1132–33 (explaining that after Heller 
and McDonald the courts became flooded with litigation, but courts and even seasoned 
judges were uncertain how to interpret these landmark cases).  This demonstrates that 
there is now much confusion regarding the Second Amendment and the Constitution.  
In addition, law enforcement officers are left to address the issue of gun violence with 
these poorly defined guidelines, and as a result of the confusion, people are finding 
more causes of action to litigate. 
 144  Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence v. Brownback, 110 F. Supp. 3d 1086 
(D. Kan. 2015). 
 145  Id. 
 146  Id. 
 147  See De Leeuw, supra note 97, at 1466–67. 
 148  See Rakove et al., supra note 100, at 55 (“Federalist supporters of the 
Constitution dominated the First Congress that met in the spring of 1789.  In framing 
the Second Amendment, they simultaneously sought to assuage the expressed Anti-
Federalist concern about the maintenance of the militia while preserving 
congressional authority over its organization, arming, and discipline.”).  
 149  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Leonard M. Niehoff, The Remarkable 
Demise of the Gun-Free School Zones Act: Is it Possible That the Commerce Clause Actually Means 
Something?, 75 MICH. B.J. 1196 (1996) (noting that the Supreme Court did something 
unusual in Lopez: it held that Congress had exceeded its authority under the 
Commerce Clause).  The case arose when Alfonso Lopez, a senior at a San Antonio 
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“substantial effects” doctrine, held that Congress’ power to legislate 
under the Commerce Clause applied only to economic activity, not to 
noneconomic conduct such as gun possession.150 
While the Lopez Court avoided the Second Amendment question 
by holding a federal gun control regulation as an unconstitutional use 
of Congress’ Commerce Clause powers, it is worth noting who was 
affected by the ruling.151 
The Gun Free School Zone Act at issue in Lopez was passed to 
address an epidemic of gun violence and fatalities that was popularly 
viewed as disproportionately killing Black youths in inner cities.152  The 
Court’s decision to value federalism concerns over the lives of these 
young people is consistent with the generalized disregard for Black 
 
high school, showed up to school with a concealed and loaded handgun. See United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).  Lopez was charged with violating a state 
statute barring gun possession in school premises.  Id. at 551.  Lopez was subsequently 
charged and convicted for violation of the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act and the 
state criminal prosecution was dismissed.  Id.  
 150  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559–61, 565–67 (holding that there was not a sufficient nexus 
between the possession of a gun within a school zone and interstate commerce); 
Victoria Davis, A Landmark Lost: The Anemic Impact of United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 
1624 (1995), on the Federalization of Criminal Law, 75 NEB. L. REV. 117, 118–19 (1996) 
(noting that Lopez was the first time since 1936 that the Supreme Court invalidated a 
federal statute because Congress had exceeded its Commerce Clause powers).  
 151  See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 602–03 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I therefore agree entirely 
with Justice Breyer’s explanation of why Congress has ample power to prohibit the 
possession of firearms in or near schools—just as it may protect the school 
environment from harms posed by controlled substances such as asbestos or alcohol.  
I also agree with Justice Souter’s exposition of the radical character of the Court’s 
holding and its kinship with the discredited, pre-Depression version of substantive due 
process . . . .  Congress’ power to regulate commerce in firearms includes the power 
to prohibit possession of guns at any location because of their potentially harmful use; 
it necessarily follows that Congress may also prohibit their possession in particular 
markets.  The market for the possession of handguns by school-age children is, 
distressingly, substantial.”); id. at 617 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Congress could have 
had a rational basis for finding a significant (or substantial) connection between gun-
related school violence and interstate commerce.”).  Further, Congress made an 
explicit finding when it amended this law in 1994 that violent crimes in school zones 
affect the quality of education, which directly affects interstate commerce.  See id. at 
618 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Breyer included in his dissent an appendix 
detailing the statistics for violent and gun-related crime in American schools.  Id. at 
632–44.  See also Carl W. Chamberlin, Johnny Can’t Read ‘Cause Jane’s Got a Gun: The 
Effects of Guns in Schools, and Options After Lopez, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 281, 281–
82 (1999) (using statistics to show the detrimental effects of guns in schools and the 
troubling public policy problem Congress faces after the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Lopez). 
 152  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549, 551–52.  See Children Carrying Weapons: Why the Recent 
Increase?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong. 1–3 (1992) (statement 
of Joe Biden, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary).  
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lives that we continue to see in law enforcement and society at large.153  
As Cook et al., noted, 
In 2005, the gun homicide victimization rate for Hispanic 
men ages 18–29 was six times the rate for non-Hispanic white 
men of the same age.  The gun homicide rate for black men 
in this age group—99 per 100,000—was a remarkable twenty-
four times the rate for white males in the same age group.  In 
addition, there appears to be considerable overlap between 
the populations of potential offenders and victims: the large 
majority of both groups have prior criminal records.154 
The rate of firearm homicide for children between the ages of five 
to fourteen is thirteen times higher than in other similarly developed 
nations, and the rate of homicide overall is three times higher in the 
United States than in other developed countries.155  Further, during 
the period of 2000 to 2010, approximately 675 Americans lost their 
lives per year as a result of accidental gunfire; two-thirds of such deaths 
occurred at the person’s home, and about half of such victims were 
under twenty-five years of age.156 
American youth today are confronted with more violence and 
prone to more fatalities than any previous generation.  Many young 
people are killed by gunfire, and the statistics show that a child is shot 
every thirty-six minutes, and many of these episodes take place at 
schools across the nation.157  Carl W. Chamberlin further states as 
follows: 
[W]ell-publicized tragedies are just the tip of the iceberg.  
Over a third of all high school students are regularly 
threatened with harm, and more than ten percent are 
actually attacked.  A surprising twenty percent of all urban 
high school students have been threatened with guns.  In 
1993 alone, over a third of urban school districts reported a 
shooting or knifing.  Furthermore, students are not the only 
ones in danger at school.  Thousands of secondary school 
teachers are physically attacked each year, and thousands 
more are threatened with harm every day.  A 1994 Gallup 
poll ranked school violence as America’s primary concern in 
education.158 
 
 153  Cook et al., supra note 133, at 1048. 
 154  Id.  See also Chamberlin, supra note 151. 
 155  Matthew Miller et al., Firearms and Violent Death in the United States, in REDUCING 
GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 3–5 (Daniel W. Webster et al. eds., 2013).  
 156  Id. at 5.  
 157  Chamberlin, supra note 151, at 283–88. 
 158  Id. at 282–83. 
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Furthermore, gun ownership is proven to be concentrated in the 
hands of few.  Based on comprehensive data and statistics, Philip J. 
Cook and Jens Ludwig, amongst others, observe the following: 
Our best estimate is that there are 200–250 million firearms 
in private circulation, meaning that there are nearly enough 
guns for every adult to have one.  But about 75 percent of all 
adults do not own any guns.  Recent survey data suggests that 
about 42 percent of males, 9 percent of females, and 35 
percent of all households have at least one gun. . . . [M]ost 
people who own one gun own many.  In 1994, about 75 
percent of all guns were owned by those who owned four or 
more, and this slice of gun owners amounted to only 10 
percent of the adult population.159 
The right of ten percent of the adult population to individually 
keep and bear arms is essentially being reframed as being an 
equivalent right that is in tension with the real public safety concerns 
that inspired gun control regulations. 
3. How Public Safety Concerns are Devalued 
Protecting individual rights is a hallmark of our modern era of 
constitutional interpretation.  The concept that an individual’s rights 
would ever be held subordinate to a collective goal seems to be 
anathema to basic precepts of justice.  This viewpoint can be observed 
in the rejection of mantras such as “the good of the many outweighs 
the good of the few,” in favor of the idea that it is better that many 
criminals be set free than for a single innocent person to be wrongfully 
convicted of a crime.160 
However, the Second Amendment, as written, is not framed as an 
individual right, but as a collective right.161  The majority that has 
 
 159  Cook et al., supra note 133, at 1045–46.  
 160  See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 474 (23d 
ed. 1854).  Leonard Nimoy, as the character Spock, once stated, “logic clearly dictates 
that the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few.”  Captain Kirk replied, “Or 
the one.”  STAR TREK II: THE WRATH OF KHAN (Paramount Pictures 1982).  This 
reasoning reflects a utilitarian ethical perspective.  
 161  See TUSHNET, supra note 102, at 48 (“Gun-control proponents offer instead 
something usually called the ‘collective rights’ view . . . .  The Second Amendment 
protects the right of states to organize their own militias—roughly, the state-organized 
National Guard we have today.  On this interpretation, the licensing-test proposal 
poses no constitutional problems whatever.  Owning a gun is indeed just like driving a 
car—not a personal right protected by the Constitution, but a privilege that 
legislatures can regulate as much as we the voters are willing to tolerate.”); TRIBE & 
MATZ, supra note 92, at 160 (noting that, in United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court 
unanimously upheld a federal firearm regulation, explaining that the purpose of the 
Second Amendment was to “assure the continuation and render possible the 
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chosen to recast the right to bear arms as an individual right is a 
majority whose self-avowed jurisprudential philosophy is based in 
originalism, or in giving credence to the original meaning of words.162 
Scalia’s holding has been duly criticized even by conservative 
scholars, including Judge Richard Posner.  Posner writes that Scalia 
cheated originalism principles, using instead “faux originalism.”163  
Posner explains that Justice Stevens’ dissent was a better argument 
because “[t]he motivation for the Second Amendment was only to 
protect the state militias from being disarmed by the federal 
government,” and the text of the Amendment as drafted does not 
enshrine an individual’s right to possess a gun for recreational or self-
defense purposes.164 
The federal government has a constitutional affirmative duty to 
ensure domestic tranquility, and the founding fathers expressly 
imposed a duty on the federal government to protect the safety and 
security of the citizens of the newly formed nation.165  The 
consequences of the Heller and McDonald decisions include the 
reshaping of the police power in the context of gun rights so that it is 
now reactionary and thus less effective at protecting the public safety 
than a preventative approach.166  Lawmakers must now consider a 
poorly defined and unclear constitutional encumbrance whenever 
they attempt to address issues of gun violence.167  Not only does the 
constitutionality of gun regulation raise questions about what laws will 
pass constitutional muster, but it also has political ramifications for 
lawmakers who could be perceived as having regulated guns too 
strictly.168 
The political concerns for lawmakers are further discussed by 
 
effectiveness of [state militias]”).  This understanding endorses the “collective rights” 
interpretation of the Second Amendment, which has nothing to do with self-defense 
rights, but instead with protecting the newly formed nation against tyranny. 
 162  See TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 92, at 164–66.  
 163  ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN 
AMERICA 283 (2011).  
 164  Id. at 283–84 (internal citations omitted).  
 165  See Victor Williams, A Constitutional Charge and a Comparative Vision to 
Substantially Expand and Subject Matter Specialize the Federal Judiciary: A Preliminary 
Blueprint for Remodeling our National Houses of Justice and Establishing a Separate System of 
Federal Criminal Courts, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 535, 653–54 (1996).  
 166  Cornell & Kozuskanich, supra note 5, at 4–6.  Much of society’s views towards 
gun dynamics have since changed, and Americans feel that more stringent gun 
controls are necessary to deal with the problem of gun violence.  
 167  See Kiehl, supra note 5, at 1132–33. 
 168  Frederic Lemieux, Effect of Gun Culture and Firearm Laws on Gun Violence and Mass 
Shootings in the United States: A Multi-Level Quantitative Analysis, 9 INT’L J. CRIM. JUS. SCI. 
74, 76 (2014).  
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Lemieux, who acknowledges that “the United States lawmakers have 
approached gun control cautiously due to the profound difference of 
opinion among the voters . . . [and because] politicians are facing a 
strong firearms lobby through gun enthusiast associations that fund 
and endorse political candidates.”169  While there has always been a 
difference of opinion on gun regulation among voters, strong firearm 
lobbies, through gun activists such as the NRA, have gained political 
influence and have been strengthened in the wake of Heller and 
McDonald.170 
As a result of Heller and McDonald, there has been less gun 
regulation, more gun accessibility, and a shift from preventative 
legislation and policing to reactive policing.171  The role of government 
is not just to arrest people once they do harm but also to limit the harm 
from happening in the first place.  Weaker gun regulations and laws 
have devastating effects on public safety, and consequently the 
government is failing to fulfill its duties of protecting the public and 
providing public safety.172  Lemieux has written on the effects between 
less government regulation on firearms, weaker gun laws, more gun 
accessibility, and their correlation to gun violence, deaths, and mass 
shootings.173  Lemieux found that gun violence and mass shootings are 
more prevalent as a result of lax and weaker gun regulations.174 
This problem of deregulating firearms is acknowledged by 
scholars in many areas including medicine.175  Garen Wintemute, a 
medical doctor and scholar, explains that as a part of the medical field, 
doctors have seen many innocent people shot with guns that were 
purchased legally and recently.176  Wintemute explains that more than 
eighty percent of shooting victims are pronounced dead at the scene 
or in the emergency department, and the fatality rate for gun-related 
injuries is eighteen times higher than those resulting from motorcycle 
injuries.177  Wintemute stresses the need for preventative regulation 
and action when he says, “society must prevent the shootings from 
occurring in the first place.”178  He emphasizes that lawmakers have 
 
 169  Id. 
 170  Id.; Kiehl, supra note 5, at 1132–33. 
 171  See Kiehl, supra note 5. 
 172  Lemieux, supra note 168, at 76. 
 173  Id. 
 174  See id. 
 175  See Garen J. Wintemute, Guns, Fear, the Constitution, and the Public’s Health, N. 
ENG. J. MED. 1 (2008).  
 176  Id. 
 177  Id. 
 178  Id. at 2. 
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misguidedly implemented a radical deregulation of gun use.179 
Wintemute notes that thirty-five states now issue concealed 
weapon permits to anyone who can legally own guns, and some states 
do not require concealed carry permits at all.180  Furthermore, some 
states have broadened self-defense laws through statutes that expand 
the circumstances under which guns may be used in self-defense.181  It 
is no longer just in one’s “castle,” but out in public where there is now 
no duty to retreat if possible before shooting.  Shooters are granted 
immunity from prosecution, and sometimes are not even liable, when 
bystanders are injured.182  Wintemute says: 
Policies limiting gun ownership and use [government 
regulations on gun control] have positive effects [that are 
wide ranging], whether those limits affect high-risk guns 
such as assault weapons or Saturday night specials, high-risk 
persons such as those who have been convicted of violent 
misdemeanors, or high-risk venues such as gun shows.183 
When gun ownership and availability rise as a result of 
government deregulation and lack of government regulation, so does 
gun violence; they rise and fall together.184  For example, in 2007, both 
New York and Chicago had strict regulations and restrictions on 
firearms ownership and use.  Both cities experienced fewer homicides 
than any other time in their history, but this ended after the Court 
handed down Heller.185 
This apparent, post-Heller libertarian reframing of rights has failed 
to consider the right to public safety.  The preamble of the 
Constitution itself raises this aspect of freedom as an important part of 
the Constitution’s purpose: “We the people of the United States, in 
order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic 
tranquility. . ., provide for the common defense, promote the general 
welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our 
posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United 
States of America.”186 
One question raised is: Whose rights are protected and whose 
rights are left unprotected?  If an individual has a right to bear arms, 
 
 179  Id. 
 180  Id.  
 181  Wintemute, supra note 175, at 2. 
 182  Id. 
 183  Id.  
 184  Id. 
 185  Id.  
 186  U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added).  
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under what circumstances can government make access to guns more 
cumbersome?  Specifically, when can government deny or largely 
curtail gun access for those who have demonstrated themselves to be 
violent or otherwise a threat to the public safety and domestic 
tranquility?187 
Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution provides: 
The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union 
a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of 
them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, 
or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be 
convened) against domestic Violence.188 
Scholars, such as Nicholas Johnson, suggest gun rights have 
consistently been recognized as a right of access for whites, and that 
whenever Blacks have sought to access weapons, action has been taken 
to limit that access.189  One argument in favor of the Court’s post-Heller 
approach is that they have actually breathed a more inclusive meaning 
to the Second Amendment that has the potential to empower racial 
minorities.190 
Johnson argues that the Second Amendment is consistent with 
the primary and most basic right of self-preservation recognized by the 
African-American tradition.191  Johnson criticizes firearm control 
 
 187  See id. 
 188  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.  
 189  See Thomas M. Moncure, Jr., The Second Amendment Ain’t About Hunting, 34 HOW. 
L.J. 589 (1991) (supporting the individual rights view of the Second Amendment that 
states that citizens have a right to protect themselves and fight tyranny, and arguing 
that the firearm tradition historically deprived Blacks, Indians, and minorities of gun 
possession).  See generally Joseph Blocher, New Approaches to Old Questions in Gun 
Scholarship, 50 TULSA L. REV. 477 (2015); AKINYELE OMOWALE UMOJA, WE WILL SHOOT 
BACK: ARMED RESISTANCE IN THE MISSISSIPPI FREEDOM MOVEMENT (2013) (contending 
that armed resistance was essential to pursue Southern freedom and dismantle 
segregation, and that Black communities overcame intimidation and oppression by 
arming themselves; pointing out that as the civil rights movement grew, armed self-
defense and resistance were the means by which African-Americans were empowered 
to develop different political and social relationships between Black and White 
Mississippians); NICHOLAS JOHNSON, NEGROES AND THE GUN, THE BLACK TRADITION OF 
ARMS (2014) (arguing that there is a long-standing yet underappreciated Black 
tradition of bearing arms for the purpose of self-defense).  Johnson cites examples 
from the pre-Civil War era to illustrate how Black individuals had to use firearms to 
protect themselves, their families, and communities.  He argues that though firearms 
were a necessary means to obtain freedom from slavery and oppression, this reality has 
been submerged, because it is hard to reconcile with the nonviolence narrative of the 
civil rights era.  Johnson reconciles this apparent tension by showing how the Black 
tradition of bearing arms for private self-defense is quite different from views 
regarding political violence. 
 190  See Moncure, supra note 189, at 592.  
 191  JOHNSON, supra note 189, at 297.  
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advocacy saying as follows: 
The black tradition of arms evokes heroic image like 
Hartman Turnbow repelling Klansmen with rifle fire.  The 
modern orthodoxy (referring to pro-regulation advocates) 
responds to the tragic scene of swaggering neighborhood 
tyrants warring over turf, their gunfire piercing the kitchens 
and bedrooms of innocent people. . . .  Supply control 
policies at the heart of modern orthodoxy rest on the 
straight-forward logic that no guns equals no gun crime.  But 
fuller consideration raises a litany of questions that reveal the 
modern orthodoxy as more reflex than considered policy.192 
In addition, minorities have been historically denied their full 
citizenship right to bear arms through complex and targeted 
regulations that included expensive licensing requirements and 
firearms training.193 
Adam Winkler states that the ability to carry a firearm in public is 
one of the rights protected by the Second Amendment and, 
consequently, giving a public official unfettered discretion to deny 
permits is akin to a constitutional violation.194  Moreover, throughout 
American history public officials have used their discretion to 
discriminate against minorities.  An example of this was the denial of 
Martin Luther King Jr.’s request for a concealed carry permit during 
the beginning of the civil rights movement.195 
However, one problem with the Court’s application of the 
conclusions drawn from these arguments is that, unlike Johnson and 
Winkler, the Court fails to fully account for those same communities’ 
elected leaders’ current calls for expanded gun regulation based on 
public safety concerns.  For them, the argument for more guns in the 
hands of the right people rings hollow in the face of both random and 
 
 192  Id.  
 193  See T. Markus Funk, Gun Control and Economic Discrimination: The Melting-Point 
Case-in-Point, 8 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 764, 794 (1995) (arguing that gun control in 
America has a long-standing history of discrimination against the poor and minorities; 
in fact, keeping guns away from Blacks has always been a concern and started as early 
as 1644 when Virginia barred free Blacks from owning firearms); Moncure, supra note 
189, at 593; David Babat, The Discriminatory History of Gun Control (2009) 
(unpublished Senior Honors Project, University of Rhode Island), 
http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/srhonorsprog/140 (alleging that gun control in the 
United States is based on a long history of discrimination that still continues to this 
day).  Blacks were the first but not the only minorities deprived of firearms access, and 
even the poor have to face the challenge of economically burdensome restrictions.  
The paper argues that firearm control has been historically used as a way to control 
specific demographic groups of the population, such as Blacks and immigrants. Id.  
 194  See WINKLER, supra note 163, at 290.  
 195  Id.  
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calculated gun-related killings by white supremacists, criminals, and 
accidental shootings.196  In this context at least, the Court appears to 
be suggesting it knows best what is in the public’s best interest—that 
thing is more, not less access to firearms. 
C. State Regulatory Consequences and Public Safety 
McDonald v. City of Chicago similarly relies on a view of gun rights 
as an individual right and not a collective right.197  In so doing, 
McDonald has contributed to a shift in the public ethos regarding rights 
to be more liberty-oriented rather than duty bound.198  In the context 
of state regulation, the Court has managed to accomplish this even as 
it has paid lip service to the majority’s avowed support of federalism as 
 
 196  In Charleston, SC, a massive church shooting took place on June 15, 2015.  
Dylann Roof, identified as the main suspect of the massacre, is a 22-year-old, white 
supremacist responsible for the killing of nine African Americans during a prayer 
service at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church.  Dylann Roof pled not guilty 
in federal court, though he later confessed.  His trial is still ongoing.  Kristine Guerra, 
‘Well, I killed them, I guess’: Jury watches Dylann Roof’s confession to church massacre, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2016/12/10/well-i-killed-them-i-guess-jury-watches-dylann-roofs-
confession-to-church-massacre/?utm_term=.8ab41fa28ea6.  Trayvon Martin, a 17-year-
old African American was fatally shot by George Zimmerman, who was acting as a 
volunteer of a neighborhood watch.  Zimmerman considered Trayvon Martin a 
prospective criminal.  Despite being advised by the 911 operator to wait for police 
officers to arrive to the scene, Zimmerman decided to use his privately-owned gun and 
shot the teenager.  Zimmerman faced jury trial and was acquitted of the crime based 
on his self-defense claim.  Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley, Zimmerman is Acquitted in 
Trayvon Martin Killing, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/us/george-zimmerman-verdict-trayvon-
martin.html.  Thirty-two people died on April 16, 2007, at the hands of a mentally-
disturbed gunman at Virginia Tech in Blacksburg, Virginia.  N. R. Kleinfield, Before 
Deadly Rage, a Life Consumed by a Troubling Silence, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/22/us/22vatech.html.  On December 14, 2012, a 
mentally disturbed individual named Adam Lanza fatally shot twenty children between 
six and seven years old, as well as six adult staff members at Sandy Hook Elementary 
School.  Prior to arriving at the school, Lanza shot and killed his mother.  Before 
getting caught by the police, Lanza committed suicide.  Stav Ziv, Report Details Adam 
Lanza’s Life Before Sandy Hook Shootings, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 25, 2014), 
http://www.newsweek.com/report-details-adam-lanzas-life-sandy-hook-shootings-
286867.  On July 20, 2012, James Eagan Holmes, dressed in tactical clothing, attended 
the premiere of the film Batman: The Dark Knight Rises, and set off tear gas grenades 
and proceeded to shoot into the audience with multiple firearms.  As a result, twelve 
people were killed and seventy were wounded.  Holmes’ defense attempted and failed 
to prove mental insanity.  Holmes faced trial and a jury sentenced him to life prison 
without the possibility of parole.  Steve Almasy et al., James Holmes Sentenced to Life in 
Prison for Colorado Movie Theater Murders, CNN.COM (Aug. 8, 2015), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/07/us/james-holmes-movie-theater-shooting-jury/.  
 197  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010); Sobel, supra note 140, 
at 509.  
 198  Heyman, supra note 94, at 251. 
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a system that protects states’ rights. 
What follows is first an examination of what rights may be 
regulated by state governments in light of McDonald v. City of Chicago.  
Next to be considered in the context of states is whose individual rights 
are protected.  Third and finally, this section will address the 
consequences to public safety coming from the current Court doctrine 
and the reluctance of states to make full use of their currently 
recognized regulatory power to enact meaningful gun control in the 
shadow of the actual and perceived constitutional doctrine. 
1. What Can Be Regulated by State Government 
McDonald v. City of Chicago is the incorporation case for the 
Second Amendment—meaning, it provides the extent to which the 
Second Amendment limits states’ ability to regulate weapons.199  As in 
some other areas where the Fourteenth Amendment has been 
incorporated to apply amendments to the states, the McDonald Court 
announced that the Second Amendment applies to state gun 
regulations.200 
In 2010, the Supreme Court, in a plurality decision written by 
Justice Alito, held that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates to the 
states the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for self-
defense.201  In McDonald, plaintiffs challenged a Chicago municipal law 
that banned individuals from possessing firearms unless they had a 
valid registration certificate.  The law also prohibited the registration 
of most handguns, and it effectively banned handguns in the city.  The 
Supreme Court struck down these laws by finding a Second 
Amendment violation.202 
According to the Court, an individual’s right to keep and bear 
arms is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and traditions,” and in 
light of its significance,203 a plurality of the Court held that the Second 
Amendment right is a “fundamental” right that should be 
incorporated to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause.204 
Adam Winkler suggests that gun rights advocates have in fact been 
 
 199  McDonald, 561 U.S. at 791. 
 200  Id. 
 201  Id. 
 202  See Caroline L. Moran, Under the Gun: Will States’ One-Gun-Per-Month Laws Pass 
Constitutional Muster After Heller and McDonald?, 38 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 163, 170 
(2013).  
 203  Id. at 171–72; McDonald, 561 U.S. at 746. 
 204  Moran, supra note 202, at 171–72; McDonald, 561 U.S. at 748–49. 
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greatly favored by Heller’s list of exceptions.  For Winkler: 
The threat of a lawsuit alone will force many lawmakers to 
reconsider ineffective or overly burdensome gun control 
laws currently on the books.  They used to be confident that 
nearly any gun law would survive a Second Amendment 
challenge in the courts, but now they must be a bit more 
careful.  In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision, New 
York City, for example, revised its permitting laws to make it 
somewhat easier and quicker for applicants to gain approval.  
Although the mayor, Michael Bloomberg, is one of the 
nation’s leading gun control advocates, his administration 
didn’t want to make the same mistake as D.C. Mayor Adrian 
Fenty and cling to a law likely to be overturned—and risk 
creating new precedents that further undermine gun 
control.205 
Once the Supreme Court declared that the Second Amendment 
was incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause, the Second Amendment became enforceable against the 
states.  The Second Amendment may now limit state power in the same 
manner that the First Amendment and other incorporated 
amendments restrict state actions.  Stacey L. Strobel has noted that as 
a result of this development: 
A number of court decisions have analyzed presumptively 
valid regulations concerning felons, mentally ill individuals, 
and sensitive places.  Some courts cases involving felons’ 
firearms rights have utilized specific standards of review 
while others have used the categorical exemptions of Heller 
and McDonald to dispose of the cases based on the felony 
status of the individual asserting their Second Amendment 
right.206 
This means that, at least theoretically, McDonald and subsequent 
cases207 recognize that the states’ ability to regulate guns is broader 
 
 205  WINKLER, supra note 163, at 291. 
 206  Sobel, supra note 140, at 509.  
 207  See Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 
136. S. Ct. 447 (2015); New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242 (2d 
Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2486 (2016); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 431–32 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (holding that a state law requiring applicants to establish a “justifiable need” 
to be allowed to carry a handgun in public for purposes of self-defense did not violate 
the Second Amendment, because it is a “presumptively lawful,” “longstanding” 
regulation); City of San Diego v. Boggess, 216 Cal. App. 4th 1494 (2013) (holding that 
a statute authorizing destruction of firearms belonging to a patient detained for 
psychiatric evaluation is not facially invalid under the Second Amendment); Williams 
v. State, 10 A.3d 1167 (Md. 2011) (holding that a statute prohibiting wearing, carrying, 
or transporting a handgun without a permit outside of one’s home was outside of the 
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than that of the federal government.  In practical terms, this means 
that states have the power to control and regulate firearms in exercise 
of their police powers. 
In Moore v. Madigan, the Federal Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit, extending the holding of McDonald, struck down two Illinois 
state statutes: the Illinois Unlawful Use of Weapons (UUW) law and 
the Illinois Aggravated Unlawful Use of a Weapon (AUUW) law, which 
prohibited the carrying of guns in public; the court found that these 
statutes violated the Second Amendment right to bear arms for self-
defense outside the home.208  In Moore, Circuit Judge Posner wrote for 
the court as follows: 
We are disinclined to engage in another round of historical 
analysis to determine whether eighteenth-century America 
understood the Second Amendment to include a right to 
bear guns outside the home.  The Supreme Court has 
decided that the amendment confers a right to bear arms for 
self-defense, which is as important outside the home as 
inside. . . .  Illinois had to provide us with more than merely 
a rational basis for believing that its uniquely sweeping ban is 
justified by an increase in public safety.  It has failed to meet 
this burden.  The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
Second Amendment therefore compels us to reverse the 
decisions in the two cases before us and remand them to 
their respective district courts for the entry of declarations of 
unconstitutionality and permanent injunctions.209 
Further, in Ezell v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit reversed the 
lower court’s decision denying a preliminary injunction in favor of the 
challengers of a Municipal Ordinance, which mandated one hour of 
range training as a prerequisite to lawfully obtaining a gun and 
prohibited all firing ranges within the city limits.210  The Seventh 
Circuit agreed with the challengers, finding that the Ordinance 
conditioned an inalienable right to possess firearms for self-defense, 
and that the total ban of firing ranges in the city was a core violation of 
the Second Amendment.211 
In Peruta v. County of San Diego, the Federal Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit recognized a violation of the Second Amendment 
right to bear arms and struck down a county regulation requiring 
individuals to show a sufficiently pressing need for self-protection 
 
scope of the Second Amendment right to bear arms). 
 208  Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935–36, 942 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 209  Id. at 942.  
 210  Ezzell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 689–90 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 211  Id. 
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before being allowed to carry a concealed weapon.212  The Ninth 
Circuit reasoned that the “good cause” requirement constituted a 
complete destruction of the right to bear arms and therefore failed 
judicial review under any level of scrutiny.213 
In Gowder v. City of Chicago, the District Court for the Eastern 
District of Illinois invalidated another local gun regulation ordinance, 
holding that the ordinance barring nonviolent misdemeanants from 
lawfully obtaining a gun was a violation of the Second Amendment.214 
Just as in the context of the federal regulatory limits, the Supreme 
Court proclaims a protection of individual rights in the form of liberty.  
Yet, the result of the McDonald holding has been the undermining of 
public safety legislation that is also designed to protect liberty.  This 
again raises the question of whose liberty is protected and why. 
2. Individual Rights Protected, but Whose? 
The public safety consequences of the new limitations on state 
gun control laws are perhaps of even greater consequence given that, 
traditionally, most gun control regulation has been done by the states.  
The question remains as to whose rights are protected by the 
combination of Lopez and McDonald, which together have quashed 
regulatory authority to regulate guns and protect the public safety, 
especially in urban Black communities. 
The answer should be that everyone now enjoys greater individual 
liberty, but given the increased gun-related deaths in the urban areas 
targeted by the regulations that the Court has struck down, this seems 
to be a dubious benefit.215 
 
 212  Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1148, 1179 (9th Cir. 2014).  See 
generally Darrell A. H. Miller, Peruta, The Home-Bound Second Amendment, and Fractal 
Originalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 238 (2014). 
 213  Reed Harasimowicz, The Comfort of Home: Why Peruta v. County of San Diego’s 
Extension of Second Amendment Rights Goes Beyond the Scope Envisioned by the Supreme Court, 
56 B.C. L. REV. E-SUPPLEMENT 51, 51–52 (2015).  
 214  Gowder v. City of Chicago, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1126 (N.D. Ill. 2012).  
 215  See Michael B. de Leeuw et al., Ready, Aim, Fire? District of Columbia v. Heller 
and Communities of Color, 25 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 133 (2009) (arguing that, given the 
high rates of violence linked to firearms in many urban areas, what constitutes a 
reasonable regulation becomes a major concern to civil rights activists and attorneys).  
De Leeuw additionally asserts that legislatures are better suited than the courts to make 
public policy and enact meaningful regulations after Heller.  It is common that the 
larger cities with more populated municipalities possess more stringent firearms 
regulations, because of the legislature’s response to the needs of the community.  
Thus, local governments should enjoy broad discretion to enact these types of 
regulations.  African Americans particularly are the main victims of gun violence.  For 
instance, in the District of Columbia, in 2004, half of the 137 gun-related homicide 
victims were Blacks.  Minorities and communities of color will be harmed by loosening 
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Skepticism towards laws of general applicability is typically 
warranted only where the costs imposed by such laws are 
disproportionately borne by minorities who have little 
influence in the political process.  By contrast, where a 
minority community supports and enacts a firearms 
regulation—as was the case with the handgun ban in the 
District—the presumption should be that the community has 
adequately weighed the civil liberties costs and possibly 
racially disproportionate effects of the regulation at issue 
against its benefits to public safety.  To assume otherwise is 
essentially to privilege the viewpoints of libertarian theorists 
and Second Amendment enthusiasts over those of the very 
citizens who live daily with the civil liberties costs of firearms 
regulations and the risk of victimization by firearms-related 
violence.216 
Lemieux found that gun violence and mass shootings are more 
prevalent as a result of weaker gun regulations.217  Lemieux found 
through his studies that the “law’s effectiveness is more due to the 
reduced access and availability of firearms[, preventative regulations,] 
rather than the deterrence measures through severity of criminal 
sentences[, which are reactive regulations.]”218  Lemieux explains that 
“a study on homicide and geographical access to gun dealers in the 
United States shows that the prevalence of federal firearms licensee 
stores is strongly correlated with homicide rates in major cities.”219 
Lemieux has based his analysis on an international comparison 
between twenty-five developed countries, a national comparison 
between the fifty states of the United States, and a case study 
comparison between public mass shootings.220  In the cross-national 
analysis it was found that “the number of mass shootings and related 
casualties in the United States far surpass221 any of the other individual 
countries included in this study during that same period of time.”222  
There is a strong nexus between the amount of mass shootings in each 
country and firearm ownership, which evidences that easier access to 
firearms and fewer firearm regulations directly relate to mass 
 
firearms regulations.  Id. at 133. 
 216  Id. at 134.  
 217  Lemieux, supra note 168, at 77.  
 218  Id.  
 219  Id.  
 220  Id. at 79. 
 221  In fact, the number of mass shootings and related casualties more than double 
the mass shootings for the U.S. than all other twenty-four countries combined in the 
same period. 
 222  Lemieux, supra note 168, at 81.  
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shootings.223  Furthermore, it was found that seventy-one percent of the 
shooters had legal and direct access to the firearms.224  It was also found 
that among the twenty-five countries included in the study, the United 
States stood out for the large number of deaths by firearms, gun 
ownership rates, and the highest number of mass shootings.225  The 
studies found that states with more restrictive regulations and more 
government regulation had fewer gun-related deaths, and the opposite 
finding was true for states that have fewer government regulations and 
more permissive gun regulations—there was a trend of more deaths as 
a result of guns.226  It was found that, both internationally and 
nationally, gun control regulation reduces overall fatalities.227  This was 
seen when the United States, which has less government gun 
regulation, was compared to other countries such as Canada and 
Australia, which have more government gun regulations.228  This was 
evident as well through comparing the various states to each other.229  
Therefore, based on the above statistics and findings, we can see how 
the public safety can be significantly impaired due to the lack of 
government firearm regulations, which was exacerbated in the wake of 
Heller and McDonald. 
Since Lopez, Chicago has experienced a steady increase in gun-
related casualties, and the death rate of Black youths has reached 
genocidal levels.230  Yet the Court doubled down on its anti-regulation 
philosophy, ignored the public safety, and found the regulations in 
 
 223  Id. 
 224  Id.  
 225  Id. at 84. 
 226  Id. at 85–86. 
 227  Id. at 90. 
 228  Lemieux, supra note 168, at 90. 
 229  Id. 
 230  See Kari Lydersen & Carlos Javier Ortiz, More Young People are Killed in Chicago 
Than in Any Other American City, THE CHI. REP. (Jan. 25, 2012), 
http://chicagoreporter.com/more-young-people-are-killed-chicago-any-other-
american-city/ (“In Chicago, more than 530 people under the age of 21 have been 
killed since 2008, and many more have been shot or have otherwise suffered 
violence—often at the hands of their peers, particularly in the city’s African-American 
and Latino communities.  Nearly 80 percent of youth homicides occurred in 22 Black 
or Latino communities on the city’s South, Southwest, and West sides—even though 
just one-third of the city’s population reside in those communities.  The rate of youth 
homicide in West Englewood on the city’s South Side, for instance, was nearly five 
times higher than the citywide mark.”); Megan Cottrell, Chicago’s Homicide Epidemic is 
a Youth Homicide Epidemic (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.chicagonow.com/chicago-
muckrakers/2013/01/chicagos-homicide-epidemic-is-a-youth-homicide-epidemic/ 
(noting that, from 2008 through 2012, nearly half of Chicago’s 2,389 homicide victims 
were killed before their 25th birthday).  See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549 (1995).  
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Heller to be unconstitutional. 
Specifically, for the city of Chicago, official statistics from the 
Chicago Police Department show that there is an overall increasing 
trend from 1991 to 2011 of homicides occurring in public places such 
as streets and parking lots.231  This is consistent with another statistical 
finding that shows an increasing trend in the percentage of murders 
occurring in the public way.232  Further, the numbers show that for the 
year of 2011, 83.4% of the homicide victims were shot and nearly all of 
those shootings involved a handgun.233  In 2011, 351 out of 436 
reported homicides involved the use of handguns.234 
In Chicago, most of the homicide victims are males between 
seventeen and thirty-five years old.235  Throughout the twenty-year study 
period, Blacks represent the overwhelming majority of homicide 
victims, at a rate of seventy percent to eighty percent of the overall 
homicide victims in Chicago.236 
Michael B. de Leeuw asserts that despite the holding in Heller, 
“[T]here are many different measures that a community could take to 
address concerns about firearms.  These will necessarily depend largely 
on the particular community and the specific concerns that the 
community is trying to address.”237  The legislature, being the voice of 
the people, should determine the reasonableness of firearms 
regulations.  Democratic principles dictate that local communities 
“should have broad authority to determine what constitutes a 
reasonable firearms regulation within its own boundaries.”238 
3. How Public Safety Concerns are Devalued 
The shift in the concept of rights is towards a view of individual 
gun owner rights being in tension with measures intended to protect 
the public safety.239  As a result of Heller and McDonald there has been 
less gun regulation.  Weaker gun regulations and laws have devastating 
effects on public safety, and consequently the government is failing to 
 
 231  2011 Chicago Murder Analysis, CHI. POLICE DEP’T, 6 (2011), 
http://4abpn833c0nr1zvwp7447f2b.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/2011-Murder-Report.pdf.  
 232  Id. at 8. 
 233  Id. at 22. 
 234  Id. at 22–23. 
 235  Id. at 32–34. 
 236  Id. at 38–39. 
 237  de Leeuw et al., supra note 215, at 136.  
 238  Id. at 136–137. 
 239  Id. 
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fulfill its duties of protecting the public and providing public safety.240 
In 2011, there were a total of 14,612 homicides reported in the 
United States; 993 of them were firearm-related.241  The Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) reported that mass shooting incidents have 
steadily increased over the past fifteen years.242  For the 2009–2013 
period, there were 22.4 incidents as compared to 20.2 incidents during 
the previous five-year period.  However, one should note that the 
number of victims killed and wounded considerably increased, with 
total casualties rising from 118.4 to 162.4.243 
The CRS concluded that from 1999–2013, twenty-one mass 
shootings occurred on average each year, and the motivation of such 
incidents falls into the following patterns: 
Four (4.4) [per year on average] were “mass public 
shootings” in which four or more victims were shot to death 
in one or more public locations, such as a workplace, school, 
restaurant, house of worship, or neighborhood, and the 
murders were not attributable to any underlying criminal 
activity or commonplace circumstance . . . .  Eight (8.5) [per 
year on average] mass shooting were “familicides” in which a 
parent, former intimate partner, or less often a child 
(progeny), shot four or more victims to death . . . .  Eight 
(8.3) [per year on average] mass shootings could be 
characterized as “other felony mass murders” in which 
victims were shot to death, and the murders were attributable 
to an underlying criminal activity or commonplace 
circumstance . . . .244 
For the 1999–2013 period, the Congressional Research study 
shows that there were sixty-six public shootings with 446 victims killed 
and 329 wounded; 127 familicide shootings killing 576 people and 
wounding thirty-seven; and 124 other felony mass shootings with 532 
victims killed and seventy-five wounded.245 
As Lemieux has indicated, and based on his extensive research, 
gun violence and mass shootings are more prevalent as a result of 
weaker gun regulations.246  For instance, Lemieux explains that “a study 
 
 240  Lemieux, supra note 168, at 75–76.  
 241  William J. Krouse, Gun Control Legislation, CONG. RES. SERV., 10 (Nov. 14, 2012), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32842.pdf.  
 242  William J. Krouse, Mass Murder with Firearms: Incidents and Victims 1999-2013, 
CONG. RES. SERV., 11 (July 30, 2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44126.pdf.  
 243  Id. at 13. 
 244  Id.  
 245  Id. at 14. 
 246  Lemieux, supra note 168, at 76. 
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on homicide and geographical access to gun dealers in the United 
States shows that the prevalence of federal firearms licensee stores is 
strongly correlated with homicide rates in major cities.”247  The statistics 
suggest that there is a strong nexus between the amount of mass 
shootings and firearm ownership, which evidences that easier access to 
firearms and fewer firearm regulations are directly related to mass 
shootings.248  With more restrictive regulations, fewer deaths by guns 
occurred, and the opposite finding was true for states that have fewer 
government regulations and more permissive gun regulations—a 
trend of more deaths as a result of guns appeared.249 
Based on the above statistics and findings, one can see how the 
public safety can be significantly impaired due to the lack of 
government firearm regulations, which was exacerbated in the wake of 
Heller and McDonald.250  This is a silent devaluing of public safety 
concerns by way of omitting them from the constitutional rights 
conversation.  While public safety remains part of the debate, it is now 
relegated to the sidelines, and is not framed at all as an affirmative 
constitutional duty.  Instead, public safety is viewed as a policy concern 
that must now be treated as subordinate to higher order liberty 
concerns. 
IV. PRE-HELLER MEANING OF SECOND AMENDMENT WAS MORE 
CONSISTENT WITH CONSTITUTION 
The 200 years of American history and legal precedent before 
Heller provides an excellent alternative approach to Second 
Amendment law.251 
 
 247  Id. at 77. 
 248  Id. at 82. 
 249  Id. at 85–86. 
 250  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); Protecting Strong Gun 
Laws: The Supreme Court Leaves Lower Court Victories Untouched, L. CTR. TO PREVENT GUN 
VIOLENCE (Aug. 2, 2016), http://smartgunlaws.org/protecting-strong-gun-laws-the-
supreme-court-leaves-lower-court-victories-untouched/. 
 251  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 637–38 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Kiehl, supra note 5, at 1133 
(explaining that, prior to Heller, the Court used an alternative approach to the Second 
Amendment, rather than that of the court in Heller).  The alternative approach that 
the Court used was that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms was a 
collective right, not an individual right as Heller held.  Kiehl explains that throughout 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries both the state and federal courts held a 
collective rights view of the Second Amendment, which was that the states had rights 
to organize militias and individuals had rights to keep weapons only connected to 
militia service and it did not provide individuals with weapons for self-defense.  Kiehl 
additionally discusses the established precedent of the state and federal courts 
regarding the Second Amendment prior to Heller and McDonald and how those 
holdings departed from precedent.  See also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; U.S. CONST. 
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This part begins by first examining Second Amendment gun 
rights as they existed before the doctrine was changed by District of 
Columbia v. Heller in 2008.252  This section will consider the earlier rule 
as well as public policy concerns animating from the rule.253  This 
section ends by considering both the theoretical and pragmatic 
advantages of the pre-Heller doctrine. 
A. Pre-Heller Policy and Theory 
Before Heller, the government experienced fewer limitations on 
its ability to regulate guns.254  As discussed above, this was because the 
Second Amendment was interpreted with fidelity to its prefatory 
clause, which led to an interpretation that respected both the 
constitutional freedom from government action that was enshrined by 
the text, as well as the simultaneous and explicitly recognized 
constitutional obligation to protect the public’s safety.255  Gun 
regulations were viewed as part of a constitutionally permissible policy 
mix whose appropriate goal was to protect public safety in accordance 
 
amend. II; Brief of NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-
290), 2008 WL 157192 *6–7; WINKLER, supra note 163, at 283–84; WALDMAN, supra note 
103, at 120–22; Hatt, supra note 5, at 514; Yassky, supra note 85, at 589–90, 613, 615–
17; Zulkey, supra note 85, at 213–14, 218; Dupree, supra note 85, at 415–18 (arguing 
that the collective rights theory was precedent and that the Court departed from it in 
Heller when it held that it was an individual right); Tushnet, supra note 102, at 164; 
Rostron, supra note 130, at 710–12.  
 252  See generally United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939).  See also Robertson 
v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 282 (1897); Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894); Presser v. 
Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); Kiehl, 
supra note 5, at 1134; David T. Hardy, The Second Amendment and the Historiography of the 
Bill of Rights, 4 J.L. & POL. 1, 1–2 (1987) (arguing that the Second Amendment protects 
a collective right, which is enshrined under the prefatory clause of the Amendment). 
 253  Siegel, supra note 100, at 83–85 (explaining how the earlier rule was based on a 
collective right to bear arms for a well-regulated militia and that its purpose and policy 
objective was to protect society by providing the states and citizens with the ability to 
resist tyranny).  Furthermore, the “Second Amendment . . . . was a response to 
concerns raised during the ratification of the Constitution that the power of Congress 
to disarm the state militias and create a national standing army posed an intolerable 
threat to the sovereignty of several states.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 637 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). Siegel also discusses the prefatory clause and how it was undermined by 
Heller and McDonald. 
 254  Cornell & Kozusnak, supra note 5, at 5–7 (explaining that the founders 
encouraged ownership of military type arms, but they regulated them closely; 
furthermore, it discusses many of the various regulations on firearms, such as who was 
eligible to own guns, what type of guns, travelling with weapons, inspection laws, 
maintenance of weapons regulations, and much more).  
 255  See id. (explaining that while politics and the modern debate over guns offer 
only two choices—pro-gun or pro-regulation—the founders were actually both pro-
gun and pro-regulation). 
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with the constitutional obligation to protect both the public welfare 
and safety.256 
1. Public Policy: Basis for Rule in Terms of Pragmatic 
Concerns and Public Policy 
One of the reasons for recognizing a public concern regarding a 
Second Amendment that is not overbroad is to ensure the ability of the 
government to engage in gun regulation that prevents violence and 
unnecessary death.257  To put it another way, one of the policies driving 
the pre-Heller jurisprudence was a recognition that arms needed to be 
regulated, but that there was a right of a free people to rise up against 
tyranny.258  By enshrining a collective right to bear arms, the 
Constitution was viewed as explicitly balancing the governmental 
obligation to provide for public safety alongside the people’s 
corresponding constitutional right to remain capable of armed 
insurrection should it become necessary.259  This collective right 
recognition is based in both an originalist interpretation of the 
Constitution as well as a policy concern regarding the relevance of 
individual versus group insurrection.260  Individual insurrection is 
simply not plausible.261 
 
 256  See U.S. CONST. pmbl.; U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 257  Lemieux, supra note 168, at 76 (explaining that we need governmental policies, 
regulations, and laws on gun control, because they prevent violence and unnecessary 
deaths; also demonstrating, through studies, the strong correlation between gun 
regulation, or the lack thereof, and violence as a result of guns).  
 258  Malcolm, supra note 100, at 50–51; Rakove et al., supra note 100, at 62; Hatt, 
supra note 5, at 514; Siegel, supra note 100, at 83, 85 (looking at the earlier rule as 
being based on a collective right to bear arms for a well-regulated militia, and 
explaining that its purpose and policy objective was to protect society by providing the 
states and citizens with the ability to resist tyranny as indicated in the prefatory clause).  
In the Federalist Papers, Publius argued that the existence of a well-armed population 
that was organized into state militias would guarantee that America never slipped into 
tyranny.  Furthermore, “[a] well-armed militia controlled by the states was necessary 
to provide the states the ultimate check on potential federal despotism.”).  Id.  
 259  U.S. CONST. amend. II; see also WALDMAN, supra note 103, at 121 (explaining that 
the prefatory clause, the “homage to the ‘well-regulated militia being necessary to the 
security of a free state,’” was important to the Framers). 
 260  See Hatt, supra note 5, at 505–06, 514; Yassky, supra note 85, at 588–90, 613, 615–
617. 
 261  See Hatt, supra note 5, at 505–06, 514, 518 (stating that the Court’s interpretation 
“creates a disparity between the firearms that citizens may legally own, and those 
possessed by the federal government” and that “the Court effectively ensures that the 
federal government will enjoy the very monopoly of armed force against which the 
Second Amendment guards.  Such laws deny citizens firearms that they would find 
most useful if compelled to defend their liberty against the federal government”).  
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2. Constitutional Theory: Reasons for the Rule Based on 
Constitutional and Democratic Theory 
Constitutional interpretative theories and democratic theory both 
support the interpretation of the Second Amendment as a collective 
and not an individual right.262  As has been stated, the actual text of the 
Second Amendment expresses in the prefatory clause that the right to 
bear arms is qualified as a militia right.263 
The new interpretation of the Second Amendment fails under 
both an originalist constitutional theory and under a theory of a living 
constitution. 
Under an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation, 
the goal is to apply the original meaning of the words used in the 
Constitution in order to limit the power of unelected judges to rewrite 
law based on their own personal value preferences.264  At the heart of 
the Lochner Era-inspired suspicion of activist, unelected judges, is 
concern that such judges will apply unprincipled or personal views 
rather than public value-based interpretations of the Constitution to 
nullify democratically passed laws.  Hence, the concern from an 
originalist perspective is to limit the Court’s power by requiring it to 
interpret the Constitution based on its original meaning.265  Competing 
approaches towards originalism were on display in the Court’s gun 
rights cases. 
With regard to a textualist approach to originalism, as previously 
stated, the prefatory clause clearly acknowledges “a well-regulated 
militia, being necessary to the security of a free state.”266  Hence, the 
earlier interpretation of this individual right was consistent with the 
text of the Constitution.  Here, the prefatory clause’s framing of a 
collective right rather than an individual right was seen as consistent 
with a textually based interpretation of the Second Amendment’s 
original meaning.267 
Another approach to originalist constitutional interpretation, 
which is frequently referred to as the “framer’s intent” approach, the 
 
 262  See Schaerer, supra note 5, at 795–96.  
 263  U.S. CONST. amend. II.  
 264  See Schaerer, supra note 5, at 795, 796, 798.  
 265  See id. at 795–96. 
 266  U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 267  Id.; Zulkey, supra note 85, at 213–14, 218; see Malcolm, supra note 100, at 50–51 
(discussing the prefatory clause); Rakove et al., supra note 100, at 62; Siegel, supra note 
100, at 83, 85. 
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meaning of any ambiguous words in the text would be interpreted 
based on the perceived intent of the framers in crafting the text.  
Following a framer’s intent approach, there is extensive historical 
support showing that the intention of the framers was clearly not to 
allow for broad individualized access to guns outside of a “well-
regulated militia.” 
 Considering the history of that moment indicates that Shays’ 
Rebellion led many to question the value of the Articles of 
Confederation as well as broad access to weapons outside of the 
control and regulation of the state government or some sort of well-
regulated militia.268 
Framer’s intent would continue to support the holding of the pre-
Heller era that the Second Amendment concerned a collective-right.  
The framer’s intent theory of constitutional interpretation is similar to 
its corollary in contract law as well as statutory interpretation.  Here 
the meaning is clear, and hence a textualist approach would suggest 
that the Second Amendment should be given its clear meaning—to 
protect the rights of collective bodies, which the text defines as 
militia.269 
When the Second Amendment was drafted, the American 
Revolution was recognized, not as a series of individual fights against 
tyranny, but as a coordinated collective effort organized by what were 
termed as local, regional, and state militia.270  The right to bear arms 
was protected as a collective right. 
History shows that even after Shays’ Rebellion there were some 
who wanted to see broad individual access to guns.271  These people 
ultimately helped to consolidate passage of a Second Amendment that 
 
 268  CORNELL, supra note 36, at 36, 58 (“Despite the quick collapse of Shay’s 
Rebellion, [it] did have an important impact on American constitutional 
development. It provided additional impetus for a growing movement to reform the 
Articles of Confederation. . . . While elites on both sides of the constitutional struggle 
were divided on many issues, leading Anti-Federalists and Federalists were in accord 
on one thing . . . Amendment, not armed resistance, was the appropriate remedy to 
any lingering problems with the Constitution.”). 
 269  U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 270  See CORNELL, supra note 36, at 50–51, 62, 82–85.  To garner support for the 
Constitution, Publius argued in the Federalist pages that the existence of a well-armed 
population that was organized into state militias would guarantee that America never 
slipped into tyranny.  Furthermore, “[a] well-armed militia controlled by the states was 
necessary to provide the states the ultimate check on potential federal despotism.”  
Danger of a standing national army and its threat to state militia were a more 
significant concern in Virginia’s debates than others.  A decade earlier, Lord Dunmore 
had attempted to seize the colony’s gunpowder and vandalize their muskets.  
Virginians were also aware that disarmament could occur in more subtle ways.  
 271  See id. 
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did not grant an individual right to bear arms.  The Carlisle riots of 
western Pennsylvania exemplify the radical pro-individual rights 
approach used to undermine stability in the country, and in a way that 
led many Anti-Federalists, who initially supported broader gun rights, 
to instead join the Federalists in supporting the Second Amendment.272 
Opposition to the Constitution was generally peaceful, except for 
in the backcountries of Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, as well as in 
parts of the Carolinas.273  The Carlisle riots of western Pennsylvania give 
a glimpse into how the Constitution was understood by the most 
radical Anti-Federalists.  Much like the followers of Daniel Shays, the 
Carlisle militia “rejected the states’ rights theory of the militia that 
mainstream Anti-Federalists had championed throughout 
ratification . . . [and] instead championed a more radical populist 
conception of democracy, rooted in the will of the local community, 
not the states.”274  William Petrikin was their spokesman.275  The irony 
is that the backcountry people were so radical and potentially 
destabilizing for the young republic, that their actions persuaded their 
fellow Anti-Federalists of the need to actually ratify the new 
Constitution.  Even these Anti-Federalists feared mob rule and 
anarchy.276 
Hence, the concept of an individual right is completely at odds 
with both the text and the history surrounding the adoption of the 
Second Amendment.277  Both the textualist and framer’s intent 
approaches to originalist constitutional interpretation support 
recognizing a collective rather than an individual right to bear arms, 
and thus broader authority to regulate guns. 
Non-originalist theories of constitutional interpretation, such as 
the theory known as a living constitution, would similarly support 
recognizing a collective right to bear arms.  The current Second 
Amendment interpretation is also inconsistent with a living 
constitution approach.  It has been almost fifteen years since the 9/11 
attacks.  Concerns about public safety and homeland security have 
increased, and there is a growing need to regulate all kinds of weapons.  
We have more powerful weapons now than during the period 
 
 272  Id. 
 273  Id. 
 274  Id. at 56. 
 275  Id. at 57–58, 80–81.  
 276  CORNELL, supra note 36, at 57. 
 277  See Hatt, supra note 5, at 505, 514; Yassky, supra note 85, at 589–90, 613, 615–17; 
Malcolm, supra note 100, at 50–51; Rakove et al., supra note 100, at 62; Siegel, supra 
note 100, at 83, 85; Schaerer, supra note 5, at 795–96, 798. 
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surrounding the founding era, when bayonets and cumbersome 
cannons were the weapons of choice for war.  Today, government 
should have the ability to regulate far more lethal arms. 
The departures in Heller and McDonald are ironic given 9/11 and 
other ongoing concerns regarding public safety, and in light of 
significant congressional concerns regarding gun violence.  The 
prevailing view today is, if anything, a fuller embrace of the 
Revolutionary War Era’s perspective on collective versus individualized 
rebellion.  As stated above, individuals were seen as having little to no 
chance of successfully rebelling against or otherwise overthrowing a 
tyrannical state because the resources that the state could bring to bear 
against a single individual or unorganized groups of individuals would 
render those individuals’ efforts futile.  Hence, the Second 
Amendment’s recognition was that a well-regulated militia, meaning a 
well-organized group of people bearing arms, is necessary for a free 
state.  By stronger force of argument, a fortiori, this is even truer today.  
While in the 1700s the state could respond to rebels by sending in 
troops armed with muskets and perhaps cannons, today’s modern state 
can destroy a rebellion with the awesome force of a standing military 
unleashed through drones, airplanes, and missiles—the seeds of 
destruction that no individual can dream of standing against.  The 
modern-day, living constitutionalism concern would suggest that an 
individual right to bear arms is manifestly less plausible today than it 
would have been in the 1700s.  Thus, only a collective right to bear 
arms would be consistent with a policy goal of maintaining a state that 
is free of tyranny by arming the people. 
Democratic theory also supports the collective over the individual 
right.  The Constitution was not written by a collection of anarchists, 
but by patriots who believed in the value of a free nation state.  
Democracy or, in the case of the United States, representative 
democracy, can be undermined, and tyranny is possible if demagogues 
are elected or the will of the people is coopted by those who control 
the governmental apparatus.  When such situations occur, Jefferson 
and other crafters of the Bill of Rights believed that it was the duty of 
the people, not the individual, to cast off the shackles of tyranny and 
liberate themselves. 
This idea of a collective obligation to rebel is at the heart of the 
Declaration of Independence.  Democracy, especially representative 
democracy, is at its very heart a collective, not an individualized, 
enterprise.  Representatives of the people represent a collective will, 
not a personal one.  Laws apply to every person without exception 
based on social or economic status.  Collective rebellion is the cure for 
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tyranny, not individualized anarchy. 
3. Minority View Pre-Heller 
Much like the majority view pre-Heller, the minority view applied 
modes of constitutional interpretation that were grounded in both 
originalist and non-originalist theories that respected the prefatory 
clause as qualifying the right to bear arms.278  Hence, the minority view 
on the pre-Heller Court regarding the scope of Second Amendment 
gun rights stopped short of recognizing a broad individual right to 
bear arms.  The public policy concern animating most of the dissenting 
views was not a question regarding an individual right but a concern 
regarding limiting the scope of the collective right. 
Much like the prevailing view pre-Heller, the minority’s analysis of 
the Second Amendment applied modes of constitutional 
interpretation that were grounded in both originalist and non-
originalist theories.279  The originalist interpretation was that the 
Second Amendment provided for a collective right to bear arms that 
was undermined by regulations placed on individuals.  The dissenters 
grounded their analysis in the original meaning of the text by 
suggesting that those affected by gun regulations fell within the 
original meaning of “militia,” or by suggesting that gun regulations 
were overbroad in going beyond legitimate regulations of individual 
activities and affecting the ability of people to organize into militia.280 
B. The Regulatory Possibilities and Public Safety 
The pre-Heller approach to the Second Amendment is preferable, 
because it promotes public safety in a manner that respects individual 
rights and governmental obligation.281  Before Heller, state governments 
 
 278  See Yassky, supra note 85, at 589–90, 613, 615–17; Malcolm, supra note 100, at 
50–51; Rakove et al., supra note 100, at 62; Siegel, supra note 100, at 83, 85; Schaerer, 
supra note 5, at 795–96, 798. 
 279  See Yassky, supra note 85, at 589–90, 613, 615–17; Malcolm, supra note 100, at 
50–51; Rakove et al., supra note 100, at 62; Siegel, supra note 100, at 83, 85; Schaerer, 
supra note 5, at 795–96, 798. 
 280  See id. 
 281  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 618–26 (2008) (while using an 
Originalist approach to interpret the scope of the Second Amendment, Justice Scalia 
fails to apply the same method of judicial construction to the assertion that the Second 
Amendment protections are limited to weapons “in common use at the time”).  Justice 
Scalia falls short in finding any textual support in the Constitution for such an assertion 
and instead draws upon Miller—the same case whose ultimate holding he has impliedly 
but effectively overruled—to find the support he needed: “[M]iller’s holding that the 
sorts of weapons protected are those ‘in common use at the time’ finds support in the 
historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons.”  
See also Miller et al., supra note 155, at 1, 4–5, 13; John S. Vernick & Daniel W. Webster, 
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were able to regulate guns without a concern regarding weapons in 
common use.282  The capacity for democratic processes to discern what 
weapons were appropriate for regulation was respected and deference 
was paid to the subjects for appropriate regulation.283  Such deference 
would be inconsistent with a recognition of a right to bear arms were 
it not a qualified right.  Respecting the prefatory clause allowed courts 
to defer to the states insofar as their regulations did not undermine 
the rights of militia.284  Pre-Heller “militia” were defined as state militias 
to which military use of firearms was granted to protect a free state 
against tyranny.285 
The approach before Heller was better because of the respect for 
basic principles of federalism—local control and deference to states as 
to their own unique needs—as well as because this doctrine respected 
the state’s duty to protect the public safety.286  These concerns are 
 
Curtailing Dangerous Sales Practices by Licensed Firearms Dealers: Legal Opportunities and 
Obstacles, in REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 133 (Daniel W. Webster et al., eds., 
2013); Lawrence E. Rosenthal & Adam Winkler, The Scope of Regulatory Authority Under 
the Second Amendment, in REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 225–234 (Daniel W. 
Webster et al., eds., 2013) (providing a statistical perspective on the impact guns have 
had on public safety since Heller was decided); Amanda C. Dupree, A Shot Heard ‘Round 
the District: The District of Columbia Circuit Puts a Bullet in the Collective Right Theory of the 
Second Amendment, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 413, 431 (2008) (arguing that, 
before Heller, neither the Supreme Court nor the circuit courts held that the Second 
Amendment is a fundamental right).  Dupree further argued that the Second 
Amendment should not be declared fundamental, because gun owners are neither a 
suspect class nor have they suffered historical persecution.  She also asserts that 
allowing for intermediate scrutiny would be detrimental to public safety and hinder 
permissible and effective gun control efforts. 
 282  Heller, 554 U.S. at 571, 618–62. 
 283  de Leeuw et al., supra note 215, at 133.  
 284  Heller, 554 U.S. at 637–38 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The view of the Amendment 
we took in Miller—that it protects the right to keep and bear arms for certain military 
purposes, but that it does not curtail the Legislature’s power to regulate the 
nonmilitary use and ownership of weapons—is both the most natural reading of the 
Amendment’s text and the interpretation most faithful to the history of its adoption.”).  
 285  David A. Lieber, The Cruiskshank Redemption: The Enduring Rationale for Excluding 
the Second Amendment From the Court’s Modern Incorporation Doctrine, 95 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1079, 1087 (2005) (“Collective right adherents assert that the militia is a 
state military force, and thus the right under the Second Amendment inures not to its 
constituent members, but rather to the ‘Militia’ as a collective entity, for the purpose 
of ensuring the ‘the Security of a Free State.’  That ‘the Security of a Free State’ is to 
be achieved by the formation of a ‘well-regulated Militia’ suggests that the ‘right of the 
people to keep and bear arms’ only exists where it effectuates that purpose.”). 
 286  See de Leeuw et al., supra note 215, at 133.  After Heller, legislatures are better 
suited than the courts to make public policy and enact meaningful regulations.  It is 
common that the larger cities, with more populated municipalities, possess more 
stringent firearms regulations, because the legislatures have responded to the needs 
of their communities.  Thus, ideally, local governments should enjoy broad discretion 
to enact this type of regulation.  African-Americans particularly are the main victims 
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related, but are deserving of separate treatment. 
This section suggests what could be applied from the pre-Heller 
doctrine to today in order to give greater fidelity to the Constitution’s 
liberty values while treating the public safety concerns as also being 
constitutional rights concerns.  Treating public safety as a 
constitutional right has the benefit of requiring greater appreciation 
for the pragmatic concerns that government must consider as 
necessary to protect the public safety. 
The section begins by considering the scope of what could be 
regulated under a revised pre-Heller approach to the Second 
Amendment.  Next, the section examines the extent to which 
individual liberty would be protected by treating the right to bear arms 
as a collective right.  The section ends by examining the advantages of 
respecting the constitutional duty to protect the public safety by 
treating the right to bear arms as a collective rather than as an 
individual right. 
1. What Government Could Regulate under a Revised Pre-
Heller Approach 
The proposal here for a revised pre-Heller approach to the Second 
Amendment would adopt much of what was seen as relevant during 
that period with an explicit appreciation for the duty to provide for the 
public safety.  Before 2008, Second Amendment doctrine implicitly 
respected the constitutional obligation to provide for the public safety.  
However, the failure of this period to explicitly name public safety as a 
countervailing constitutional duty that limits the scope of an individual 
liberty led to the possibility, and today’s reality, of jurisprudential 
confusion.287  A revised pre-Heller approach to the Second Amendment 
would explicitly name the constitutional duty to provide public safety 
as the policy reason for the textual limitation on the right to bear arms 
that is in the text of the Second Amendment’s prefatory clause.288 
Based on an originalist approach, Justice Stevens argued in his 
 
of gun violence.  For instance, in Washington D.C., half of the 137 gun-related 
homicide victims were Blacks.  Minorities and communities of color will be harmed by 
loosening firearms regulations.  Cornell & Kozuskanich, supra note 5, at 4. 
 287  See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939).  
 288  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 681 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The second independent 
reason is that the protection the Amendment provides is not absolute.  The 
Amendment permits government to regulate the interests that it serves.  Thus, 
irrespective of what those interests are—whether they do or do not include an 
independent interest in self-defense—the majority’s view cannot be correct unless it 
can show that the District’s regulation is unreasonable or inappropriate in Second 
Amendment terms.  This the majority cannot do.”). 
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dissenting opinion in Heller that, “[T]he Amendment is most naturally 
read to secure to the people a right to use and possess arms in 
conjunction with service in a well-regulated militia.”289  According to 
Justice Stevens’ originalist analysis of the Second Amendment in his 
dissenting opinion in Heller: 
The Second Amendment was adopted to protect the right of 
the people of each of the several States to maintain a well-
regulated militia.  It was a response to concerns raised during 
the ratification of the Constitution that the power of 
Congress to disarm the state militias and create a national 
standing army posed an intolerable threat to the sovereignty 
of the several States.  Neither the text of the Amendment nor 
the arguments advanced by its proponents evidenced the 
slightest interest in limiting any legislature’s authority to 
regulate private civilian uses of firearms.  Specifically, there 
is no indication that the Framers of the Amendment 
intended to enshrine the common-law right of self-defense 
in the Constitution.290 
This is a better approach, because it allows states flexibility to 
customize gun control regulations that appropriately relate to each of 
their unique needs.291  The unique needs of the states vary from an 
interest in preserving a hunting culture that grants broad access to 
related weapons, to a desire to reduce access to lethal artillery in highly 
populated urban areas.292  Deference to state and local governments as 
to policy decisions of this sort is part and parcel to federalism and 
indeed is recognized as part of what allows a diverse and 
 
 289  Id. at 646 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 290  Id. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 1551 (2009) (criticizing Scalia’s “originalist” reasoning in Heller because 
the founding fathers’ justifications for the Second Amendment did not include self-
defense at home, but instead a desire to preserve the right of the people to fight 
tyrannical governments, serve in a militia for national defense, or use guns for 
hunting). “This right envisioned by the founders was anything but homebound.”  
 291  See de Leeuw et al., supra note 215, at 133. 
 292  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 682 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Even [assuming that the 
Second Amendment protects the right to possess arms for purposes of self-defense] . . . 
a legislature could reasonably conclude that the law will advance goals of great public 
importance, namely, saving lives, preventing injury, and reducing crime.  The law is 
tailored to the urban crime problem in that it is local in scope and thus affects only a 
geographic area both limited in size and entirely urban; the law concerns handguns, 
which are specially linked to urban gun deaths and injuries, and which are the 
overwhelmingly favorite weapon of armed criminals; and at the same time, the law 
imposes a burden upon gun owners that seems proportionately no greater than 
restrictions in existence at the time the Second Amendment was adopted.  In these 
circumstances, the District’s law falls within the zone that the Second Amendment 
leaves open to regulation by legislatures.”). 
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heterogeneous union of states to remain united. 
The concern regarding rights was also balanced by the pre-Heller 
doctrine.  The concern that rights ought to trump federalist goals is 
one that is more frequently opposed by the members of the majority 
that supported Heller.293  For Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and 
Roberts, states’ rights are generally viewed as central and of greater 
value than many individual rights, including the right to privacy, 
freedom of speech, and Fourth Amendment rights.294  From their 
perspective, much of the Fourteenth Amendment’s incorporation of 
the Bill of Rights and other fundamental rights is an affront to 
federalism and principles of states’ rights; but this is not so when it 
comes to the Second Amendment.  Here, there is a reversal of their 
typical adherence to Jeffersonian principles of democracy, which 
include smaller and more localized government. 
The reason for the change is an adherence to an ideology and 
value judgment that broad access to guns is a public benefit.295  While 
this is a plausible policy argument that is appropriate for democratic 
debate, it was never elevated to the level of constitutional doctrine 
prior to Heller.296 
A revised pre-Heller approach to the Second Amendment would 
treat the right as a collective right and would define a militia as a group 
in a manner consistent with the pre-Heller meaning.297  The goal is to 
 
 293  See Patrick M. Garry, A One-Sided Federalism Revolution: The Unaddressed 
Constitutional Compromise on Federalism and Individual Rights, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 851, 
853 (2006) (indicating that by looking at constitutional history there is an inverse 
relationship between the Court’s activism on substantive individual rights and the strict 
enforcement of federalism principles: “The less the Court enforces structural 
provisions, the more it relies on creating and enforcing substantive individual rights.  
Consequently, now that the Court is reinvigorating federalism, it should 
correspondingly lessen its activism on individual rights, such as the right to privacy”). 
 294  See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009); see also J.D.B. v. North 
Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 
1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).  
 295  See Moncure, supra note 189, at 589; Blocher, supra note 189, at 477.  See generally 
JOHNSON, supra note 189; UMOJA, supra note 189.  
 296  See TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 92, at 155 (noting that, until Heller, there was no 
precedent to limit gun regulation legislation enacted by the federal government).  In 
2010, the Supreme Court in McDonald extended this newly recognized individual right 
to self-defense against state and local law regulations.  Before Heller, no federal law had 
been struck down under the Second Amendment.  Miller was generally understood as 
an endorsement of a “collective rights” interpretation. 
 297  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 645 (2008) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“Similarly, the words ‘the people’ in the Second Amendment refer back 
to the object announced in the Amendment’s preamble.  They remind us that it is the 
collective action of individuals having a duty to serve in the militia that the text directly 
protects and, perhaps more importantly, that the ultimate purpose of the Amendment 
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respect both the right to armed resistance against tyranny and the 
governmental obligation to protect the public safety.298  Much of the 
current post-Heller approach to the Second Amendment could then be 
appended to this revised pre-Heller approach as limitations on the 
government’s ability to interfere with the access of militias to guns.  In 
this context, proscriptions against barring access to weapons in 
common use would take on a meaning that is more consistent with the 
original intent of the framers. 
2. Individual Rights Protected as Part of a Collective Right? 
Treating the right to bear arms as a collective right would also 
protect the individual right.  Collective access to weapons such as guns 
would include an individual right to join a militia.  Individual rights 
should not be balanced against group or collective rights; rather, the 
collective rights should be defined as the access point to individual 
rights.299 
Through group membership, individuals gain greater freedom.  
This concept is consistent with E. Pluribus Unum–out of many, one.  
The group by definition is capable of protecting and adding meaning 
to rights in a way that no single individual is capable.  By contrast, 
providing access first to the individual rather than the group is a recipe 
for the devolution of public order and anarchy rather than for 
democratic self-governance.  Hence, the notion of a “well-organized 
 
was to protect the State’s share of the divided sovereignty created by the 
Constitution.”); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281–82 (1897).  
 298  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Second Amendment 
was adopted to protect the right of the people of each of the several States to maintain 
a well-regulated militia.  It was a response to concerns raised during the ratification of 
the Constitution that the power of Congress to disarm the state militias and create a 
national standing army posed an intolerable threat to the sovereignty of the several 
States.  Neither the text of the Amendment nor the arguments advanced by its 
proponents evidenced the slightest interest in limiting any legislature’s authority to 
regulate private civilian uses of firearms.”). 
 299  Joseph Raz, Rights and Politics, 71 IND. L.J. 27, 32 (1995) (“First, groups as well as 
individuals possess rights.  Group rights, the rights of nations, families, and the like, 
are based on the interests of these groups.  Naturally, there is no intrinsic value in 
protecting the interests of groups.  Their interests merit protection only to the extent 
that they serve individual interests.  Whatever the ultimate justification of group rights, 
they are the rights of groups and not of individuals.  Nor do they derive their 
justification from individual rights; rather, their proximate justification is in the 
interest of the group, and their ultimate justification lies in the service to individual 
interests of advancing the interest of the group.”); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 
77–78 (expanded ed., 2006) (“Here I stress that full autonomy is achieved by citizens: 
it is a political and not an ethical value.  By that I mean that it is realized in public life 
by affirming the political principles of justice and enjoying the protections of the basic 
rights and liberties; it is also realized by participating in society’s public affairs and 
sharing in its collective self-determination over time.”). 
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militia” recognizes that being organized as a group is a precursor to 
the effectiveness of the right to bear arms.300 
Rights are by definition counter-majoritarian, and the 
incorporation of the Bill of Rights, again by definition, undermines 
principles of federalism.301  However, by individualizing a collective 
right, the Court has distorted the democratic and federalism concerns.  
It has created a tension where none needed to exist.  The pre-Heller 
approach protected the collective right to rebel against tyrannical 
government while respecting the public obligation to prevent 
individualized violence and lethal crimes.  Thus, the illusory tension 
between liberty and community was explicitly resolved by a prefatory 
clause that clarified both the reason for and scope of the right.  Justice 
Stevens is on point in his dissent in Heller when he writes: 
The preamble to the Second Amendment [referring to the 
prefatory clause] makes three important points.  It identifies 
the preservation of the militia as the Amendment’s purpose; 
it explains that the militia is necessary to the security of a free 
State; and it recognizes that the militia must be “well 
regulated.” . . .  It confirms that the Framers’ single-minded 
focus in crafting the constitutional guarantee “to keep and 
bear Arms” was on military uses of firearms, which they 
viewed in the context of service in state militias.  The 
preamble thus both sets forth the object of the Amendment 
and informs the meaning of the remainder of its text.  Such 
text should not be treated as mere surplusage, for “[i]t 
cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is 
intended to be without effect.”302 
Furthermore, the individual right to oppose tyranny was 
protected though the possibility of the individual joining a militia 
 
 300  See Joseph Raz, Rights and Politics, 71 IND. L.J. 27, 32 (1995); JOHN RAWLS, 
POLITICAL LIBERALISM 77–78 (expanded ed., 2006). 
 301  See Ronald J. Bacigal, Federalism and the Criminal Justice System, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 
771, 773 (1996) (describing and analyzing the process of incorporation of the Bill of 
Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, and the endeavors of 
the Warren court to achieve those ends, especially in the criminal justice system).  The 
Bill of Rights’ purpose was to limit the powers of the federal government and was 
aimed to protect the states and individuals from tyranny by the federal government.  
On the other hand, individual states were seen as guarantors of rights and liberties.  
However, the fact that the states endorsed slavery demonstrated that they could not be 
trusted to safeguard the liberty of all citizens.  When the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments came into existence, it became necessary to make the Bill of Rights 
applicable to the states through the gradual incorporation process.  This process 
inherently represents a deviation from principles of federalism.  
 302  Heller, 554 U.S. at 640, 643 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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group.303  The Court considered that very possibility in pre-Heller cases 
where, among other things, the right of an individual to join a militia 
group that provided access to weapons was determined to be 
constitutionally protected, notwithstanding public safety concerns.304 
3. Public Safety Concerns Not Devalued or Required to be 
Ignored 
A revised pre-Heller approach to the Second Amendment would 
have the added advantage of explicitly recognizing the constitutional 
duty to protect the public safety.  This recognition would help end the 
problematic rights versus order dichotomy that has unnecessarily 
complicated constitutional law.  It would create doctrinal space for 
developing a more coherent jurisprudence that treats liberty, such as 
the right to bear arms, as linked to duties like the duty to protect the 
public safety. 
The state’s duty to protect public safety is the obvious motivation 
for gun regulations.  This duty is frequently cited in court opinions 
regarding the Second Amendment as well as in the text of the actual 
gun control regulations that the court has scrutinized both before and 
since Heller.305  This Article suggests that, before 2008, the Court 
 
 303  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 570, 644–45 (Stevens, J., dissenting); CORNELL, supra note 
270, at 50–51 (explaining how, to get support for the Constitution, Publius, in the 
Federalist Papers, argued that the existence of a well-armed population that was 
organized into state militias would guarantee that America never slipped into tyranny); 
Hatt, supra note 5, at 514. 
 304  See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 
U.S. 275, 282 (1897); Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 
252 (1886); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). 
 305  See Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 
136. S. Ct. 447 (2015); New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242 (2d 
Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2486 (2016); Jackson v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 746 F.3d 
953 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that gun ordinances enacted in San Francisco survived 
intermediate scrutiny), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2799 (2015); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 
431–32 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that state law requiring applicants to establish a 
“justifiable need” to be allowed to carry a handgun in public for purposes of self-
defense did not violate the Second Amendment because it is a “presumptively lawful” 
and “longstanding” regulation); Hunters United for Sunday Hunting v. Pa. Game 
Comm’n, 28 F. Supp. 3d 340 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (under rational basis test the court 
upheld a statute which made it unlawful for any person to hunt for any furbearer or 
game on Sundays because the Second Amendment protections do not extend to 
recreational hunting); City of San Diego v. Boggess, 216 Cal. App. 4th 1494 (2013) 
(holding that a statute authorizing destruction of firearms belonging to a patient 
detained for psychiatric evaluation is not facially invalid under the Second 
Amendment); Williams v. State, 10 A.3d 1167 (Md. 2011) (holding that statute 
prohibiting wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun without a permit and outside 
of one’s home was outside of the scope of the Second Amendment right to bear arms); 
Norman v. State, 159 So. 3d 205, 210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that a 
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recognized this obligation as significant because there was a limitation 
on the scope of the right through the prefatory clause.  The prefatory 
clause is textual evidence for an original intent to maintain the ability 
of even the federal government to regulate firearms.306 
Public safety concerns today are real, yet the Court’s decisions 
with regard to gun control laws appear to consistently relegate them to 
being a secondary concern in their hierarchy of constitutional rights.  
This is because of their distorted libertarian perspective, under which 
jurists follow Justice Kennedy’s model for rights that are exclusively 
framed in negative, libertarian form without appreciation for the very 
purpose of government.307  If government is to have any value it must 
exist to actually do something, and the most obvious something is to 
protect the public safety. 
The rights versus order dichotomy dominates American 
jurisprudential and political theory.  It embraces the linear philosophy 
that increasing rights decreases the possibility of public order, and that 
increasing public order decreases individual rights. 
The conclusion that rights, when viewed as including both 
positive rights and negative rights—governmental duties as well as 
individual liberties—need not require a reduction in public order is 
an insight that Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum, and others have long 
 
regulation against open carry of firearms did constitute a total ban on the carrying of 
firearms outside the home for self-defense).  Under intermediate scrutiny, the statute 
in Norman v. State was reasonably related to the State’s substantial governmental 
interest in regulating firearms as a matter of public safety.  The court stated, “[i]n 
addressing a Second Amendment challenge to a statute, the court must determine 
whether the challenged law burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment 
based on a historical understanding of the scope of the Second Amendment right, or 
whether the challenged law falls within a well-defined and narrowly limited category 
of prohibitions that have been historically unprotected; to answer this question, we ask 
whether the regulation is a presumptively lawful regulatory measure, or whether the 
record includes persuasive historical evidence establishing that the regulation at issue 
imposes prohibitions that fall outside the historical scope of the Second Amendment.”  
Id. at 205–06. 
 306  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 637–38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 307  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 599; TUSHNET, supra note 102, at 164; Zulkey, supra note 
85, at 213–14, 218; Yassky, supra note 85, at 589–90, 613, 615–17; Heyman, supra note 
94, at 251.  See also CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 110 (1978) (explaining the main 
differences between positive and negative rights).  Fried finds the following: “A positive 
right is a claim to something—a share of material goods, or some particular good like 
the attention of a lawyer or a doctor, or perhaps the claim to a result like health or 
enlightenment—while a negative right is a right that something not be done to one, 
that some particular imposition be withheld.  Positive rights are inevitably asserted to 
scarce goods, and consequently scarcity implies a limit to the claim.  Negative rights, 
however, the rights not to be interfered with in forbidden ways, do not appear to have 
such natural, such inevitable limitation.”  Id.  
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espoused.308  This is also the core of the Second Amendment’s qualified 
right to bear arms—a link between liberty and the duty to preserve the 
public safety. 
Creating a doctrinal space that recognizes that rights and order 
are not part of a zero-sum equation requires a jurisprudence free from 
the libertarian bias which has limited the scope of constitutional rights 
protected by the current Court.  Liberty is essential to democracy, but 
government is obligated to do more than “not act.”  Government has 
certain basic duties, among the most obvious being the obligation to 
provide for and protect the public safety.  Failure to fulfill that 
obligation is itself a breach of the most basic component of the social 
contract that every government enters into with its people, and ought 
to be treated as a violation of a basic right of citizenship. 
These public relations, public policy, and political theory insights 
have textual support within the text of the Constitution.  The Second 
Amendment itself describes the well-regulated militia as a precursor to 
the right to bear arms to protect a free state. 
Article I describes the government’s obligation to protect the 
public safety and welfare.  It also contains a Privileges and Immunities 
clause which explicitly recognizes that there are both constitutionally 
protected privileges of citizenship and constitutionally recognized 
immunities, or liberties, of citizenship.309  Finally, the Constitution’s 
most comprehensive and rights-altering amendment, the Fourteenth 
Amendment, reinforces the recognition of governmental obligations 
within its Privileges or Immunities Clause. 
Public safety concerns would not be devalued by taking the 
Constitution seriously.  It is obvious that public safety would be more 
easily protected by a revised pre-Heller approach to the Second 
Amendment.  Both the federal and state governments would have 
more space to pass common sense gun regulations that address public 
safety concerns, while allowing constitutionally sanctioned space for 
the additional regulation of non-governmental groups that fall within 
the constitutionally recognized militia.  Liberty, duty, and public order 
would become additive forces that, when properly applied, enhance 
each other as democratic principles under constitutional law, rather 
than acting as forces that run in opposition to each other in a tragedy 
of zero-sum accountability. 
 
 308  Heyman, supra note 94, at 251. 
 309  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.  
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CONCLUSION 
The current Second Amendment doctrine embraces a long 
abandoned Lochner Era jurisprudence that elevates a distorted 
perspective regarding individual liberty and collective obligation.  This 
proposal to apply a revised, pre-Heller approach to the Second 
Amendment would restore the Constitution’s intended recognition of 
both liberty and governmental duty as part of a unified view of rights, 
under which the constitutional framework can together enhance 
public order.  Public safety should be respected as a positive 
fundamental right under the Constitution. 
 
